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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case has gained notoriety in North Idaho as the "Road Rage" Case. 1 
Following a heated confrontation on the roadway, Jonathon Ellington was chased at 
high speed for miles by four individuals in two separate cars. Eventually, one of those 
cars cornered, and then essentially ''T-boned,'' Mr. Ellington's vehicle. Following that 
impact, Mr. Ellington then crashed headlong into the second vehicle that had been 
chasing him, driving that vehicle off the roadway. As Mr. Ellington disengaged from the 
second vehicle and started to drive towards open road, one of the occupants of the first 
vehicle (who was by then outside his vehicle and pOSitioned right near Mr. Ellington's 
passenger-side door) fired his.44 Magnum into the front quarter panel of Mr. Ellington's 
vehicle. Mr. Ellington sped off and, in the process, ran over and killed the driver of the 
first car. 
Mr. Ellington was apparently the only one charged. He was charged with two 
counts of aggravated battery and one count of second degree murder. Although one 
magistrate judge refused to bind Mr. Ellington over on any of the original charges, the 
prosecution obtained a more favorable decision from a second magistrate judge and, 
thus, was allowed to bring Mr. Ellington to trial. Ultimately, a jury found Mr. Ellington 
guilty, and the district court imposed a sentence of 25 years, with 12 years fixed. 
1 See, e.g., Idaho v. Ellington: Road Rage Murder Trial, Court TV News Website 
( <htlp:/Iwww.courttv.com/trials/taped/ellington/background3tv.html> ) (last visited Jan. 31, 2008); Dave 
Turner, Judge Drops Murder Charge, CDAPress.com (available at 
<http://www.cdapress.com/articles/2006/01/25/newsinews01.txt» (posted Jan. 25, 2006); 2006: The 
Year In Review, SpokesmanReview.com (available at 
< http://www.spokesmanreview.com/20061?Iist=news>)(lastvisitedFeb.11 , 2008). 
1 
On appeal, Mr. Ellington contends that his conviction was a result of bias and 
prejudice, not a reasoned consideration of the evidence. Specifically, Mr. Ellington 
asserts that: (1) as part of a much larger pattern of trying to prejudice the jury, the 
State, with prosecutor Arthur Verharen at the helm, committed four distinct acts of 
misconduct; (2) the district court erred in admitting certain highly prejudicial information; 
and (3) the entire panel of prospective jurors was tainted by comments made by three of 
their peers. In addition, Mr. Ellington contends that there was such an accumulation of 
errors in this case that he was denied a fair trial. Accordingly, Mr. Ellington respectfully 
requests that his conviction and sentence be vacated, and that his case be remanded 
for a new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Although many people no doubt looked forward to the start of 2006 with hopes 
for a happy, prosperous year, the new year was ushered in by tragedy for a number of 
North Idahoans. By nightfall on New Year's Day, a woman would be dead, her husband 
and children would be facing emotions they had most likely never encountered before, 
and an innocent man would be in jail on a murder charge. 
Jonathon Ellington, who was then living with his fiancee, Ann Thomas on 
Brunner Road in a fairly rural area of Kootenai Count;? (Tr., p.1156, L.14 - p.1157, 
2 For the ease of this Court's reference, Mr. Ellington has attached hereto a map of the relevant area as 
Attachment A Because the layout of the roads in Kootenai County is a fact which is generally known, 
and is capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to any number of sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned, this Court can take judicial notice of the attached map. Cf LR. E. 201. 
In addition, there are a number of aerial photographs of the relevant area in the record as trial 
exhibits. Perhaps the most helpful of these is Exhibit 2, which is an oveNiew of the entire area and bears 
labels for all of the relevant roads. 
2 
L.12),3 awoke early on the morning of January 1, 2006.4 (See Tr., p.1165, Ls.11-21.) 
He got up and decided to go visit a friend, Ron Cunningham, who lived a few miles 
away on Scarcello Road, so he drove his gold and white Chevrolet Blazer over to 
Mr. Cunningham's home sometime around 6:00 or 6:30 a.m. (Tr., p.1165, Ls.15-21, 
p.1064, L.20 - p.1 065, L.6.) 
Mr. Ellington spent a few hours visiting with Mr. Cunningham. (See Tr., p.1066, 
Ls.3-4, p.1068, Ls.18-23, p.1069, L.10 - p.1070, L.7.) Although Mr. Cunningham did 
not remember Mr. Ellington leaving to run to the store (see Tr., p.1068, L.18 - p.1069, 
L.10), apparently, shortly before 9 a.m., Mr. Ellington went to the Twin Lakes Trading 
Post (see generally Ex. K (surveillance footage from the Twin Lakes Trading Post», 
where he picked up a Zima malted beverageS and a bottle of juice. (Tr., p.1332, Ls.4-
12.) While he was there, he "seemed to be in a very happy mood." (Tr., p.1332, Ls.13-
20.) He spent most of his time there chatting and laughing with the clerks. (See Ex. K 
at 01:33 - 07:15.) Apparently, Mr. Ellington then returned to Mr. Cunningham's 
3 There are numerous transcripts in the record in this case, all of which are referenced herein. The 
transcript containing the bulk of the proceedings in this case, including Mr. Ellington's jury trial and 
sentencing hearings, is referenced simply as "Tr." The transcript of the jury selection proceedings, which 
was prepared in response to Mr. Ellington's September 27, 2007 Motion to Augment Record and 
Suspend Briefing Schedule, is referenced as "Supp. Tr." The five-volume set of transcripts of the 
preliminary hearing held over the course of three days in February 2006, and appearing as exhibit to the 
Clerk's Record, is referenced as "Second Prelim. Tr." Finally, the four-volume set of transcripts of the 
preliminary hearing held over the course of two days in January 2006 in Kootenai County Case No. CR-
F06-0033, and attached to the contemporaneously-filed Motion to Augment Record, is referenced as 
"First Prelim. Tr." 
4 The State tried to convince the jury that Mr. Ellington and Ms. Thomas had had a fight that sent 
Mr. Ellington into an hourS-long rage. (See, e.g., Tr., p.119, Ls.5-8, p.125, Ls.1-9.) However, 
Ms. Thomas made it clear that Mr. Ellington and she had simply had a "disagreement," and that there had 
been no screaming, shouting, etc. (Tr., p.1162, Ls.3-6, p.1163, L.24, p.1175, Ls.10-14.) She further 
testified that this disagreement stemmed from the fact that Mr. Ellington was frustrated because 
Ms. Thomas was in poor health and had not been taking care of herself as she should have been. 
(Tr., p.1165, Ls.8-10, p.1175, Ls.15-19; see also Tr., p.1185, LS.10-19 (describing Ms. Thomas' various 
health conditions and her failure to take care of herself, as well as Mr. Ellington's concern for her 
welfare).) 
5 It is undisputed that Mr. Ellington was drinking that morning. However, it does not appear that 
Mr. Ellington was ever charged with DUI. (See R. Vol. I, pp.35-37.) 
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residence where he remained until approximately 11 :00 a.m., when he left to go home. 
(SeeTr., p.1066, Ls.3-4, p.1068, L.18-p.1070, L.7.) 
As Mr. Ellington was driving northbound on Ramsey Road (apparently 
somewhere north of Ramsey's intersection with Scarcello, but south of its intersection 
with Brunner), he came upon two young ladies, Jovon (age 21) and Joleen (age 18) 
Larsen,6 who were riding in Jovon's white Honda Accord. (See Tr., p.350, Ls.11-14, 
p.351, Ls.7-16, p.1193, Ls.14-16, p.1194, L.6.) The girls were also driving northbound 
on Ramsey? (See Tr., p.349, Ls.16-21, p.350, Ls.9-17, p.1193, L.24 - p.1194, L.1.) 
As Mr. Ellington came up behind the girls, they began playing "cat and mouse" 
with him, i.e., slowing down for a time then, when Mr. Ellington attempted to pass them, 
blocking his pass attempts by speeding up and pulling into the oncoming lane.s (See 
Tr., p.1168, Ls.22-25, p.1170, Ls.7-10, p.1171, Ls.8-11, p.1187, L.19 - p.1188, L.7.) 
The girls also "flipped off" Mr. Ellington, i.e., displayed their middle fingers in what is 
widely-considered an obscene or offensive gesture. (Tr., p.1187, L.23 - p.1188, L.1.) 
After Mr. Ellington was finally able to pass the girls-right before Ramsey came to a 'T' 
at Brunner-he stopped his Blazer in the northbound lane, got out, and approached the 
driver's side window of the girls' Honda (which had stopped directly behind the Blazer). 
(Tr., p.351, L.20 - p.352, L.24, p.353, Ls.3-22, p.408, L.24 - p.409, L.4, p.1195, Ls.7-
22.) Mr. Ellington yelled and cursed at the girls for some length of time, then banged on 
6 Jovon and Joleen are sisters. In order to avoid confusion, they are identified herein by their first names 
and, when referred to collectively, are referenced as "the girls." 
7 The girls were on their way to their parents' house in Athol. (Tr., p.1191, L.16 - p.1193, L.6.) Their 
father is Joel Larsen, and their mother was Vonette Larsen. (Tr., p.1191, Ls.16-18.) 
8 Joleen maintains that the girls were doing absolutely nothing wrong and that Mr. Ellington was angry at 
them for no discernible reason. (Tr., p.4D8, Ls.1-13.) Likewise, Jovon asserts that the girls did not flip 
Mr. Ellington off. (Tr., p.1233, Ls.3-5.) 
4 
the driver's side window9 before returning to his Blazer and leaving. (Tr., p.352, LS.23-
p.353, L.2, p.354, Ls.3-14, p.354, L.20 - p.355, L.11, p.356, Ls.10-12, p.409, LS.19-25, 
p.1195, L.23-p.1196, L.1.) 
The girls were obviously frightened by Mr. Ellington's reactions, so Joleen called 
9-1-1 on her cell phone. (Tr., p.355, Ls.17-23; see also Tr., p.1196, LS.15-17 (Jovon 
testifying that she told her sister to call 9-1-1).) Unfortunately, however, the girls did not 
stop at merely reporting the incident to the police; they decided to become vigilantes. 
As Mr. Ellington turned east onto Brunner towards his home, the girls decided to chase 
him. (Tr., p.356, Ls.13 - 20, p.1197, Ls.9-13.) Clearly, the girls did not want to let 
Mr. Ellington get away with what they believed was obnoxious and unwarranted 
behavior. (See Tr., p.356, Ls.18-24 (Joleen testifying that she and Jovon could not see 
any license plates on the Blazer and that they wanted the police to be able to find 
Mr. Ellington); Tr., p.410, LS.7-20 (same); p.1197, LS.14-17 (Jovon testifying as to the 
same reasoning); Ex. 151, track 1 at 01 :50 (approximately two minutes into the chase, 
Jovon stating in the background that "I want him definitely pulled over," and Joleen, in 
response, telling the 9-1-1 operator that "we-yeah-something definitely needs to be 
done); see also Tr., p.370, LS.9-15 (Joleen testifying that the girls chased Mr. Ellington a 
second time later that day, again, so the police could find Mr. Ellington), p.1206, LS.7-9 
(Jovon testifying that the second chase was to "make sure we saw where he went").) 
As the girls chased Mr. Ellington eastbound on Brunner, Mr. Ellington stopped in 
the middle of the eastbound lane and backed up quickly towards the girls. (Tr., p.356, 
L.25 - p.358, L. 7, p.1198, L.6 - p.1199, L.5.) However, the girls were not deterred and 
9 Despite an utter lack of foundation for her opinion, Joleen was allowed to testify, over a defense 
objection, that the "window was very close to breaking." (Tr., p.355, Ls.2-11.) 
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they resumed the chase when Mr. Ellington again tried to leave. (Tr., p.358, Ls.7-13, 
p.1199, Ls.3-5.) From Brunner, Mr. Ellington turned northbound on Weir Road, which is 
a gravel road. (Tr., p.358, Ls.8-11, p.1199, L.5, Tr., p.1200, L.4.) The girls followed, 
accelerating as they went. (Tr., p.412, Ls.17-19.)'0 From Weir, Mr. Ellington turned 
eastbound onto Seasons Road, which is also apparently gravel (in relevant part). 
(Tr., p.358, L.18 - p.359, L.1, p.1199, Ls.17-21, Tr., p.1200, Ls.6-7.) The girls kept up 
their pursuit (Tr., p.359, Ls.2-3), accelerating to approximately 60 mph on Seasons. 
(Tr., p.413, Ls.11-13.) Before too long, Mr. Ellington hit a snowy patch of roadway and 
temporarily lost control of his Blazer. (Tr., p.359, Ls.4-8, p.1199, L.22 - p.1200, L.3) 
Apparently realizing that he was not going to be able to outrun his pursuers, 
Mr. Ellington then tried a new tactic-he turned around and tried going back in the 
direction from which he had come. (Tr., p.359, Ls.9-14, p.1200, Ls.11-16.) As he did 
so, he briefly drove toward the girls in their lane, but then sweNed back into his own 
lane to get around them and again try to leave.
" 
(Tr., p.359, L.15 - p.360, L.3, p.1200, 
L.21 - p.1201, L.7.) 
Following Mr. Ellington's U-turn maneuver, the girls seemed to hesitate. Joleen 
asked the 9-1-1 operator: "Do you want us to turn around?" (Ex. 151, track 1 at 02:53.) 
10 Joleen tried to downplay the girls' speed by testifying that they did not have to go as fast Mr. Ellington 
because they were not trying to catch him, just keep him in view. (Tr., p.412, L.20 - p.413, L.15.) 
However, this testimony rings hollow since the girls had to have been at least close to pacing 
Mr. Ellington's speed in order not to have lost him. 
11 In her trial testimony, Joleen testified that Mr. Ellington came within ten feet of them at a high rate of 
speed (Tr., p.359, L.17 - p.360, L.3; see also Tr., p.1201, L. 7 (describing Mr. Ellington as having come 
"pretty close"»; however, the recording of the 9-1-1 call reveals that Joleen did not sound particularly 
alarmed as Mr. Ellington briefly entered the girls' lane of travel (see Ex.151, track 1 at 02:34 - 02:50), 
indicating that he was probably not as close or as fast as the girls would have had the jury believe. 
Jolene also testified that, as Mr. Ellington went by them, he flipped them off and mouthed the words, "fuck 
you." (Tr., p.359, Ls.23-25, p.360; see also Ex. 151, track 1 at 02:44 (Joleen stating "he just friggin' 
flipped us off').) 
6 
The operator, who at that point had no basis to know how fast the girls had been 
driving, told them: "It's up to you. I don't want you to get-to get into-hurt or anything 
so." (Ex. 151, track 1 at 02:53.) Clearly not recognizing the risk, the girls chose to 
continue their pursuit (Tr., p.413, Ls.16-18), explaining to the operator that "we're trying 
to stay back." (Ex. 151, track 1 at 02:56.) 
Whether it was the U-turn type of maneuver itself, or some hesitation that that 
maneuver had caused in the girls, Mr. Ellington was able to put enough distance 
between himself and the girls that the girls could not catch up to him again as he fled 
back toward Weir, and then from Weir back toward Brunner. (See Tr., p.360, Ls.9-11, 
p.1201, Ls.15-21.)12 The girls were able to stay close enough to see Mr. Ellington's 
Blazer turn westbound onto Brunner (back toward Mr. Ellington's home and then 
Ramsey Road) (Tr., p.360, Ls.15-19, p.1201, L.22 - p.1202, L.4), but by the time the 
girls got to the corner of Weir and Brunner, Mr. Ellington's Blazer was gone (Tr., p.361, 
Ls.5-6, p.1202, Ls.2-4). Although the girls did not know it at the time, Mr. Ellington had 
gone back to his home on Brunner. (See Tr., p.1168, Ls. 1 0-25 (Ann Thomas testifying 
that Mr. Ellington had arrived home at approximately 11 :30 a.m. complaining about two 
girls having played "cat and mouse" on the road).) 
After searching briefly for Mr. Ellington at the western end of Brunner Road, the 
girls agreed to return to the intersection of Brunner and Ramsey to wait for the sheriff's 
deputy whom the 9-1-1 operator promised was en route. (Tr .. p.362, Ls.9-24, p.1202, 
Ls.14-21; Ex. 151, track 1 at 06:08 - 06:44.) The operator told Joleen to "[sJtay there 
12 Although Jo/een testified that "we kept our distance," as if to tell the jurors that she and her sister were 
driving cautiously, that testimony is belied by the 9-1-1 recording, which picked up Joleen and Jovon's 
discussion and seems to reveal that Joleen was urging her sister to speed up so as to not lose 
Mr. Ellington. (See Ex. 151, track 1 at 04:29.) 
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and if you see him [Mr. Ellingtonl, call me back on 9-1-1." (Ex. 151, track 1 at 06:45.) 
Seconds later, the operator reiterated her instruction as to what the girls should do if 
they saw Mr. Ellington again: "If you see him, call me back on 9-1-1." (Ex. 151, track 1 
at 06:52.) At that point, Joleen terminated her call with the 9-1-1 operator and 
proceeded to call herfather.13 (Tr., p.363, Ls.8-19, p.752, L.3 - p.753, L.4.) 
After speaking with Joleen, Mr. and Mrs. Larsen jumped into Mrs. Larsen's 
maroon Subaru-with Mrs. Larsen driving-to go meet their daughters. (Tr., p.753, 
Ls.4-5, 11-14, p.755, Ls.5-22.) Mr. Larsen, by his own admission, was at that point 
upset at what had happened with his daughters. (Tr., p.799, Ls.12-15.) As Mr. and 
Mrs. Larsen approached their daughters' location, they kept a keen eye out for 
Mr. Ellington's Blazer, but obviously never saw it. (See Tr., p.799, Ls.20-22.) They met 
their daughters at the corner of Ramsey and Brunner (where the girls were still waiting 
for the police to arrive) and got the girls' story as to what had just happened. 
(Tr., p.363, Ls.20-22, p.364, L.15 - p.365, L.7, p.756, Ls.8-11, p.1203, Ls.7-16.) Attrial, 
Joleen admitted that when her father heard about Mr. Ellington having hit the girls' 
window, he was angry; she explained that "[hle was upset that it happened to his girls .. 
.. 14 (Tr., p.418, Ls.17-19.) After talking to the girls, Mr. and Mrs. Larsen set off down 
13 Joleen claims she was calling her parents' home to let them know that the girls would be late in arriving 
there. (Tr., p.363, Ls.8-12: see a/so Tr., p.1203, Ls.1-3 (Jovon testifying that the purpose of Joleen's call 
was to let their parents know what had happened and to "let them know why [they] weren't there" at their 
parents' house yet).) However, this explanation is highly questionable since Jovon and Joleen were not 
expected at their parents' house at any particular time. (Second Prelim Tr. Vol. II, p.230, L.17 - p.231, 
L.3.) Perhaps a more accurate explanation of why Joleen called her parents and specifically asked for 
her father (Second Prelim. Tr. Vol. II, p.255, Ls.1-4), is that she wanted him to do something about 
Mr. Ellington. 
14 Apparently realizing she had deviated from the family story, Joleen promptly backtracked, explaining 
that she could not know what emotions her father was feeling, and claiming that his behavior was 
completely normal. (Tr., p.418, L.17 - p.419, L.10.) 
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Brunner to once again try to locate Mr. Ellington. (Tr., p.365, Ls.10-25, p.418, Ls.2-9, 
p.757, Ls.2-21, p.1203, L.17 - p.1204, L.2.) 
Because the girls believed (correctly, as it turned out) that Mr. Ellington must 
have pulled into one of the driveways between Weir and Ramsey, that is where Mr. and 
Mrs. Larsen went looking for him. (Tr., p.365, Ls.10-25, p.1202, Ls.2-13, p.757, LS.2-
21, p.1203, L.17 - p.1204, L.2.) In the course of their search, they came upon a man 
and a woman tending to some donkeys, and they stopped to ask whether the couple 
had seen Mr. Ellington's Blazer. (Tr., p.757, Ls.19-21, p.758, LS.1-8, 17-19.) One of 
those individuals, Susie Cooley-Denney, ultimately testified that when Mr. Larsen asked 
about the Blazer and the couple denied having seen it, he asked again and "kept 
looking around [them] as if he didn't believe [them]." (Tr., p.1284, Ls.5-15.) She also 
testified that Mr. Larsen was "very agitated, aggressive, ancy [sic], angry," and that she 
felt afraid of him. (Tr., p.1285, Ls.16-20.) 
While Mr. and Mrs. Larsen were looking for Mr. Ellington, Deputy William 
Klinkefus, the police officer dispatched to respond to the girls' 9-1-1 call, finally arrived 
and met up with the girls at the corner of Ramsey and Brunner. (Tr., p.365, Ls.18-22, 
p.1102, Ls.15-25.) The time was approximately 12:20 or 12:30 p.m. by then. 
(Tr., p.1102, Ls.19-23.) In speaking to the girls, Deputy Klinkefus noted that they were 
excited and giggling. (Tr., p.1148, Ls.3-8.) He spoke to them briefly about the 
"altercation" they had had with Mr. Ellington, but the girls failed to mention how fast they 
had been going while chasing Mr. Ellington. (Tr., p.1103, Ls.7-14, p.1147, L.23 -
p.1148, L.2; see generally Ex. 148 at 078 - 152.15) Deputy Klinkefus then provided 
15 Exhibit 148 is the microcassette from the recorder in Deputy Klinkefus' pocket. That recorder was 
running throughout most of this incident. 
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them with witness forms on which to write out their statements (Tr., p.1104, Ls.4-9), and 
left to go search for Mr. Ellington's Blazer himself (Tr., p.1105, Ls.2-14). Before leaving, 
however, Deputy Klinkefus specifically instructed the girls as follows: "Just sit tight here 
for me. Your cell phone works here, right? Okay, so if he shows up again, call it back . 
. .. Okay, well let me go drive around a little bit. I'll be back in a few minutes." (Ex. 148 
at 142 - 152; accord Tr., p.420, Ls.18-25, p.1104, Ls.24-25, p.1105, Ls.5-7, p.1148, 
Ls.9-14, p.1231, Ls.20-25.) He certainly did not tell them that they should chase 
Mr. Ellington if they saw him again. (Tr., pA21, Ls.1-3, p.1148, Ls.15-16.) 
Having seen that a police car had arrived, and that an officer was talking to their 
daughters, Mr. and Mrs. Larsen headed back toward the corner of Ramsey and Brunner 
to join in the conversation. (Tr., p.758, L.24 - p.759, L.10.) By the time they arrived, 
however, Deputy Klinkefus had already turned westbound on Brunner and was actually 
driving away from them. (Tr., p.421, LsA-8, p.759, Ls.10-13, 18; see also Tr., p.1105, 
LS.9-14 (Deputy Klinkefus explaining where he went to begin his search), p.1145, L.14-
p.1147, L.10 (Deputy Klinkefus explaining why he went the opposite direction from 
where the girls said they though Mr. Ellington might be).) In speaking to his daughters 
again, Mr. Larsen was "irritated," "agitated," "angry," and apparently even "pissed off' 
because Deputy Klinkefus had seemingly gone the wrong direction on Brunner.16 
(Tr., p.804, Ls.2-13, p.1231, Ls.6-12; seeTr., p.837, Ls.16-23.) 
After speaking with their daughters for a second time (Tr., p.1204, Ls.13-22, 
p.759, Ls.17-21), Mr. and Mrs. Larsen headed back to the driveways between Ramsey 
and Weir to resume their search for Mr. Ellington's Blazer. (Tr., p.422, Ls.10-12, p.760, 
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Ls.3-8, p.1204, Ls.23-25.) Before too long, Mrs. Larsen stopped the Subaru so 
Mr. Larsen could get out and approach one of the residences-. he claims he was going 
to ask permission to walk their property and peak over their fence into a neighbor's 
yard. (Tr., p.760, Ls.6-13, 16-21.) Before Mr. Larsen got to the residence, however, he 
heard Mr. Ellington's Blazer start, and then he saw it drive down an adjacent driveway 
and back onto Brunner Road. (Tr., p.761, Ls.8-16, 22-23.) Mr. Larsen ran back to the 
Subaru and he and Mrs. Larsen gave chase. (Tr., p.761, Ls.18 - 23, p.762, Ls.12-19, 
p.806, L.20 - p.808, L.16.) 
After Mr. Ellington had been home for a half hour or more, he left again. 
(Tr., p.1173, Ls.15-20.) However, as he turned westbound onto Brunner, he 
immediately found himself being pursued again-this time by a maroon Subaru. (See 
Tr., p.368, Ls.20-21, p.423, Ls.11-19, 23-25, p.761, Ls.18 - 23, p.762, L.12 - p.763, 
L.6, p.1173, L.23 - p.1174, L.13.) In addition, as he approached his left turn at Ramsey 
Road, he undoubtedly saw the same white Honda that had chased him earlier. (See 
Tr., p.368, Ls.1-18, p.1206, Ls.1_3.)17 
As Mr. Ellington passed, Jovon decided to disregard Deputy Klinkefus' instruction 
to "sit tight," and she pulled her Honda out behind Mr. Ellington (but in front of her 
parents' Subaru) to begin her second chase of the day. (See Tr., p.369, Ls.7-10, p.424, 
Ls.7-19, p.1206, Ls.4-6, p.1206, Ls.1-6, p.1232, Ls.4-8.) In the meantime, as both cars 
chased Mr. Ellington southbound on Ramsey, Joleen placed a second call to 9-1-1 to 
16 Joleen would not testify that Mr. Larsen was further irritated by the fact that Deputy Klinkefus had 
seemingly gone the wrong direction in looking for Mr. Ellington, again claiming that she could not know 
what her father was feeling. (Tr., p.421, L.25 - p.422, L.g.) 
17 Jovon and Joleen testified that Mr. Ellington glared at them, flipped them off, and again mouthed "fuck 
you" as he turned southbound onto Ramsey. (Tr., p.368, Ls.1-18, p.1206, Ls.1-3.) 
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report that "we just found him." (Ex. 151, track 2 at 00:05; accord Tr., p.368, L.21 -
p.369, L.2.)18 
Although Mr. Ellington was, in the estimation of Joleen, "friggin' hauling" (Ex. 151, 
track 2 at 00:33; see also Ex. 151, track 2 at 01:09) and ultimately reached speeds that 
probably approached 100 miles per hour (Ex. 151, track 3 at 00:12) in his effort to get 
away from his pursuers, Joleen nevertheless urged her sister to "go faster" to keep up 
with him. (Ex. 151, track 2 at 00:33.) Very early on in this second chase, however, 
even before learning just how fast everyone was gOing, the 9-1-1 dispatcher made it 
clear that the girls were not justified in breaking the law or endangering anyone's life: 
"Well, I don't want you to break any rules or laws-just have to be very, very careful." 
(Ex. 151, track 2 at 00:38.) Less than a minute later, after Joleen had made it clear that 
Mr. Ellington's speed was quite high and appeared dangerous (Ex. 151, track 2 at 
01 :09), the dispatcher again cautioned the girls against the risk of proceeding as they 
were: "I know you don't want to lose him but I don't want you guys to-you know, he's 
probably scared as well. That's probably why he's driving fast. But I don't want you 
guys to get hurt." (Ex. 151, track 2 at 01:17.) Unfortunately, Joleen dismissed the 
dispatcher's warnings, stating: "Yeah, I know. We're keeping it reasonable. He's not." 
(Ex. 151, track 2 at 01:30.) 
As the chase continued southbound on Ramsey, the 9-1-1 operator placed 
Joleen on hold for a few moments. (Ex. 151, track 2 at 01 :36.) While the operator was 
off the line, the girls, obviously oblivious to the dangerous situation that they had put 
themselves in, chatted and laughed. (Ex. 151, track 2 at 01:56 - 02:12.) Apparently, 
18 The second 9-1-1 call was also recorded. The recording of that call, which covers the chilling final 
moments of the incident at issue in this case, can be found on the second and third tracks of the compact 
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this high-speed pursuit was a fun adventure for them. (See Ex. 151, track 2 at 01:56-
02:12; see also Tr., p.1148, LS.3-8 (Deputy Klinkefus' testimony about the girls having 
been excited and giggling when he met them at the corner of Brunner and Ramsey).)'9 
When the 9-1-1 operator came back on the line, she specifically asked Joleen 
how fast the girls were going. (Ex. 151, track 3 at 00:07.) Joleen estimated that 
Mr. Ellington was probably going 100 mph because, "as bad as it sounds, we're almost 
doing 90.,,20 (Ex. 151, track 3 at 00:12.) Joleen then reported that they were following 
Mr. Ellington eastbound onto Scarcello Road. (Ex. 151, track 3 at 00:23.) Moments 
later, she reported that "we're back up to 90 again." (Ex. 151, track 3 at 01 :05.) At that 
point, the dispatcher passed on Deputy Klinkefus' order that the girls stop chasing 
Mr. Ellington: "Okay, he [Deputy Klinkefusj wants you to pull over and not-not follow 
him at that speed, okay?" (Ex. 151, track 3 at 01:07; see also Ex. 148 at 227 - 242 
(Deputy Klinkefus inquiring as to whether the girls were still following Mr. Ellington and 
at what speed, and, upon learning of the speeds involved, staking: "Okay. Tell them to 
disregard and pull over. I don't want them following him anymore.").) Unfortunately, the 
girls once again disregarded Deputy Klinkefus' instructions and kept up their pursuit. 
(See Tr., p.1207, Ls.14-21.) In fact, Joleen did not even pass the dispatcher's order on 
to Jovon. (Tr., p.1235, Ls.16-18; see Ex. 151, track 3 at 01:13.) Instead, she 
essentially just told the dispatcher "no"; she said, "[wjell we want to keep our-we can 
slow down. That's not a problem. We just want to see where he turns when gets on 
disc that is Exhibit 151. In addition, an enhanced copy of the second 9-1-1 call was admitted as Exhibit 2. 
19 Notably, while speaking to a back-up officer, Deputy Klinkefus astutely observed that "[a]pparently 
they're not in fear of their safety if they're going to continue to follow this guy." (Ex. 148 at 238.) 
20 Jovon down played her speed, testifying that she was driving approximately 80 mph down Ramsey 
Road. (Tr., p.1207, Ls.2-4, p.1235, Ls.4-6.) 
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41." (Ex. 151, track 3 at 01 :13.) This turned out to be an absolutely tragic decision on 
Joleen's part. 
Approximately twenty seconds after the 9-1-1 operator gave the unheeded order 
for the girls to stop, Mr. Ellington, with both cars still behind him, began to initiate a left 
turn toward a driveway on the south side of Scarcello Road. (Ex. 151, track 3 at 01 :27.) 
Thus began a critical 29 second (or less) window of time that would change many 
peoples' lives forever. 
Mr. Ellington was apparently going too fast to make his left-hand turn into the 
driveway, so he skidded up to a snowbank at the northwest corner of the driveway he 
was apparently aiming fOr.21 (Tr., p.865, Ls.4-9, p.1207, Ls.19-21; see also Ex. 151, 
track 3 at 01 :32 (Jovon stating in the background: "Daddy, daddy, he just went into a 
snow bank").) Moments later, Joleen, who was still narrating, said, "oh my God, he's 
turning around.,,22 (Ex. 151, track 3 at 01:35.) 
As Mr. Ellington was conducting a three-point turn (Tr., p.865, Ls.10-12), the girls 
were slowing to a stop a few yards away-mostly in their correct (westbound) lane of 
travel. (Tr., p.427, Ls.13-17.) Also at that time, Mr. and Mrs. Larsen crossed the 
centerline (driving into the eastbound lane of travel), passed the girls,23 and began 
angling the Subaru into the driveway that Mr. Ellington had skidded into and backed out 
21 Mr. Ellington's lengthy skid marks into the driveway apron can be seen on the right side of Exhibit 15. 
22 Although the Court can obviously judge Joleen's tone for itself, Mr. Ellington submits that her voice 
reflects that at that moment in time, she was at most concerned. but certainly not alarmed in any way. 
~See Ex. 151, track 3 at01:35.) 
3 Although Jovon does not specifically remember her comment about the snow bank (Tr., p.12, LS.13-
15), she acknowledged that it is her voice that can be heard making that comment on the 9-1-1 tape, and 
she testified that the statement seems to have been made at about the point where her parents' Subaru 
was passing her Honda in the eastbound lane (Tr., p.1224, L.16 - p.1225, L.l). 
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of. (Tr., p.427, L.18 - p.428, L.23, p.765, L.23 - p.766, L.13.) Mr. and Mrs. Larsen's 
intention was to block the Blazer in.24 (Tr., p.839, Ls.8-9; Ex. 147 at 12:46:45.) 
While the back-up portion of Mr. Ellington's three-point turn had properly taken 
him into the eastbound lane of Scarcello (pointing eastbound, the direction from which 
Mr. Ellington and his pursuers had come) (Tr., p.766, Ls.14-25, p.1208, Ls.15-17), he 
was not able to stay in that lane to go eastbound to leave the scene. (See Tr., p.1255, 
LS.17 -18; Ex. 15 (photograph looking east and showing that Mr. Ellington's lane was 
mostly blocked by the Subaru).) As Mr. Ellington began heading eastbound, he had to 
swerve to his right, back onto the driveway apron, in an effort to avoid Mr. and 
Mrs. Larsen's Subaru, which, as noted, was angling into his path and was blocking the 
majority of the eastbound lane. (SeeTr., p.615, LS.15-16, p.766, Ls.9-11, p.767, Ls.5-9, 
p.811, LS.16-19, p.950, Ls.9-13, p.1437, L.24 - p.1438, L.15; Ex.H; Ex.L; see also Ex. 
15 (photograph, looking eastward, showing the Subaru blocking the eastbound lane of 
travel and the driveway apron and shoulder that Mr. Ellington had to swerve onto in an 
effort to avoid the Subaru).) He was not completely successful, however, and the front 
end of the Larsens' Subaru impacted the driver's side door area of Mr. Ellington's 
24 Mr. Larsen is now insistent that he and his wife were not trying to block Mr. Ellington in; he claims they 
were merely trying to block Mr. Ellington from hitting their daughters' car. (See, e.g., Tr., p.766, Ls.9-13, 
p.767, Ls.5-9, p.811, Ls.12-15, p.812, Ls.9-10, p838, Ls.8-9, p.839, L.21 - p.840, 1.7.) However, back 
on January 1, 2006, Mr. Larsen stated the following while describing the incident to Deputy Klinkefus: "I 
said 'well now's our chance, block him in.' And the wife went around here, came up here .... " (Ex.147 
at 12:46:45 - 12:46:54; see a/so Tr., p.1117, Ls.2-5 ("He said at that point he was able to park his vehicle 
behind the Jimmy [sic] in an attempt to block him in so they could wait for law enforcement to get there.").) 
A few hours later, Mr. Larsen made a similar statement to one of the investigating detectives: "I told the 
wife, I go, I go, block him in or get in front of him." (Tr., p.839, LS.8-9 (reading a portion of the transcript of 
his interview with Detective Stewart).) At trial, Mr. Larsen tried to explain the change in his story as being 
the result of his having failed to clearly articulate to the officers what he had told his wife during the 
incident, explaining: ''I'm not a man of big words. My wife had just been spattered over the road." 
(Tr., p.838, Ls.8-20, p.840, Ls.8-12.) 
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Blazer.25 (Tr., p.768, Ls.1-6, p.812, L.19 - p.813, L.18, p.1433, Ls.12-14.) As 
Mr. Ellington continued past the Subaru and onto the soft shoulder to the south of the 
eastbound lane, his Blazer made a turn back toward the left (the location of the 
roadway). (Tr., p.615, Ls.17-20, p.950, L.25 - p.951, L.6, p.1436, Ls.11 - p.1437, L.3; 
see also Ex. H (diagram depicting looping acceleration marks left by the Blazer as it 
went around the Subaru, across the driveway apron, onto the shoulder, and, finally, 
back onto the roadway); Ex. L (same).) Mr. Ellington did not regain the eastbound lane 
and start heading east though; instead, he began crossing that eastbound lane and, 
right before reaching the centerline,26 impacted the front left corner of the girls' Honda.27 
25 Joleen and Mr. Larsen both maintain that the Blazer hit the Subaru. (See, e.g., Tr, p.373, Ls.9-16 
(Joleen testifying that her parents "were hit by the SUV"); Tr., p.767, Ls.14-16 (Mr. Larsen testifying that 
"he came across and hit us"), p.812, Ls.10-12 (same), p.812, L16 - p.813, L18 (same), p.862, Ls.19-21 
(same).) However, Joleen's testimony was inconsistent with her testimony from Mr. Ellington's first 
preliminary hearing, where she testified that "I couldn't tell you who purposely hit who," and that it was 
possible that the Subaru had rammed the Blazer. (First Prelim. Tr. Vol. II, p.250, L.24 - p.251, L.6.) In 
addition, such a characterization of the facts defies logic since the Subaru was still moving as its front end 
impacted the side of the Blazer as the Blazer swerved right (and off the road) in obvious attempt to avoid 
the Subaru. (Tr., p.373, LS.17-22 (Joleen admitting that her parents' car was moving forward at the time 
of impact), p.767, Ls.14-20 (Mr. Larsen admitting the same).) 
26 Throughout the case against Mr. Ellington, the girls maintained that they were parked in the center of 
the westbound lane. (See, e.g., Tr., p.375, Ls.1-2 (Joleen claiming Mr. Ellington came across the 
centerline in order to hit the Honda), p.437, LS.13-18 (Joleen testifying that the Honda was in the center of 
the westbound lane).) However, that testimony is belied by the physical evidence (see Tr., p.1441, L.18-
p.1442, L.8), namely a scuff mark demonstrating that the Honda's left front tire was on, or just over, the 
centerline when the Honda was struck (Tr., p.1442, Ls.8-10), and a debris field which extended well into 
the eastbound lane (Tr., p.1442, L10 - p.1443, L.l0; see also Ex.13 (photograph depicting the debris 
field from the Honda)). Notably, this was the testimony of one the State's Idaho State Police accident 
reconstructionists at Mr. Ellington's second preliminary hearing, but that police officer changed his 
testimony at trial. (See Tr., p.643 , L.118 - p.644, L.13; see also Second Prelim. Tr. Vol. IV, p.451 , LS.17-
20 (prior inconsistent testimony from Trooper Robnett).) Nevertheless, he still had to concede that the 
front left corner of the Honda extended across the centerline into the eastbound lane. (See Tr., p.674, 
Ls.1-21.) 
27 The accident reconstructionist retained by the defense, William Skelton, Jr., Ph.D., opined that the 
Subaru's impact with the Blazer caused the Blazer to rotate to the left, and that this rotation, combined 
with Mr. Ellington's attempt to steer the Blazer to the left to regain the roadway, caused the Blazer to turn 
left too hard and put it on a collision course with the girls' Honda. (Tr., p.1434, Ls.12-14, p.1439, L.1 -
p.1440, L.20.) Dr. Skelton further opined that, given the Blazer's full acceleration and the Honda's 
location over the centerline, Mr. Ellington did not have time to react before he collided with the Honda. 
(Tr., p.1447, L3 - p.1448, L.3.) 
On the other hand, one of the State's reconstructionists, Idaho State Police Detective Sean Daly, 
although he made no effort to calculate any speeds or evaluate reaction times, repeatedly offered his 
opinion that because the tire marks left on the roadway did not evidence any loss of control, i.e., loss of 
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(See Tr., p.874, Ls.8-21 (opinion of State's witness that the Blazer rotated as part of an 
overcorrection), p.1438, L.16 - p.1440, L.20 (defense expert opinion that the hit by the 
Subaru caused Mr. Ellington's Blazer to rotate into the Honda)); see a/so Ex. 152, track 
1 at 01 :46 (crashing sound, presumably as the Blazer impacted the Honda).) All of 
this-from Mr. Ellington's initiation of his turn into the driveway, to his sliding into the 
snow bank and his three-point turn to get out of the driveway, to his being hit by the 
Subaru, and, finally, to his collision with the Honda-happened in only eleven short 
seconds. (See Ex. 152, track 3 at 01:35 -01:46.) 
When the Blazer and the Honda collided, the taller Blazer rode up onto the 
Honda28 and actually got hung up for a time as the Blazer pushed the Honda 
northeastward onto the shoulder on the north side of the road. (Tr., p.1442, L.23 -
p.1443, LA, p.1441, Ls.1-9, p.1448, LSA-9, p.1453, L.25 - p.1454, U8.) As this was 
happening, Mr. Larsen claims that he reached under his seat in the Subaru and 
grabbed the Smith & Wesson A4 Magnum revolver that he had just happened to leave 
there the previous day.29 (Tr., p.754, Ls.6-11, p.773, L.25, p.774, Ls.9-17.) He and 
traction, of the Blazer, Mr. Ellington must have subjectively intended to hit and push the Honda, and he 
must have subjectively intended to hit Mrs. Larsen. (See, e.g., Tr., p.878, L23 - p.880, L.5 (testifying that 
because there was no sign of catastrophic loss of control, Mr. Ellington must have been in full control and 
he could have "simply left the area traveling eastbound"); p.889, LS.14-16 ("The driver of the Blazer is 
maneuvering that Blazer through steering and acceleration and intentionally pushing it."); p.917, Ls.1-12 
(testifying that perception and reaction time is irrelevant if there is no physical evidence of evasive action, 
and that "Mr. Ellington could have ... driven into the proper lane"), p.932, Ls.12-16 ("I'd like to define this 
as an incident, not an accident. An accident is when you're walking through the forest with your wife and 
a tree hits her, or your husband."), p.972, Ls.10-17 (testifying that it was not necessary to determine the 
speed of the Blazer because "[t]here isn't an accidenf').) Of course, even assuming Trooper Daly is 
correct as to his conclusion that there was no loss of traction, his reasoning on the intent issue is so 
circular as to be patently absurd. He says that reaction time is relevant only if there is evidence of loss of 
control, i.e., a reaction, before the fact; however, in order to evidence of a reaction, there would have to 
have been time to react. 
28 Mr. Larsen claims that the tires of the Blazer rode ali the way up onto the hood of the Honda. (See, 
e.g., Tr., p.776, Ls.18-20.) However, there is absolutely no physical evidence to support such a claim. 
ISee Tr., p.1448, U5 - p.1450, L.24.) 
9 Mr. Larsen's explanation of how that gun happened to be in his wife's car is dubious, to say the least. 
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Mr. Larsen, who had recently undergone surgery on his left arm, had absolutely no use of that 
arm in late December 2005 and early January 2006. (Tr., p.747, LS.14-20 ("Oh yeah, I couldn't do 
anything with it, it was in a cast and a sling.").) Consequently, he was unable to go to work as a truck 
driver during that timeframe (and even for months afterward). (Tr., p.746, Ls.15-18, p.750, L.17 - p.751, 
L.1, p.794, Ls.8-11.) In addition, at trial, he conceded that driving stick-shift automobiles was "very hard" 
to do back in early 2006. (Tr., p.753, L.12 - p.754, L.1.) Indeed, on the day of the incident around which 
this case revolves, when Mr. and Mrs. Larsen went to meet their daughters, Mr. Larsen had his wife drive 
the Subaru. (Tr., p.753, Ls.22-25.) Nevertheless, he claims that on New Year's Eve Day (the day prior to 
the events in question in this case), he took Mrs. Larsen's Subaru, a stick-shift, to go hiking/hunting. 
(Tr., p.750, Ls.1-16, p.754, Ls.6-14.) (It took a while for Mr. Larsen to get his story straight on what he 
was supposedly doing that day. Initially, he told the police he had been out coyote hunting. (See 
Tr., p.843, Ls.8-19.) By the time of Mr. Ellington's trial, however, his story had shifted to where he had 
supposedly been hiking and "horn hunting," i.e., looking for deer and elk antlers. (Tr., p.750, Ls.1-16.) 
When confronted with this discrepancy, Mr. Larsen explained that "[iJl's just an interpretation .... " 
(Tr., p.851, Ls.9-12.).) He says he took Mrs. Larsen's stick-shift Subaru, instead of his brand-new pickup 
with the automatic transmission, because "it's a great big truck, gas hog." (Tr .. p.844, Ls.14-17; see also 
Tr .. p.754, Ls.1-5 (explaining that the family owned a number of stick-shift automobiles and a big pickup 
that has an automatic transmission).) However, one cannot help but wonder how, if his bad arm kept him 
from working as a truck driver, it could have possibly been a reasonably decision to take the stick-shift 
Subaru instead of the new truck with the automatic transmission hunting/hiking. 
In addition, Mr. Larsen claims that he took his .44 Magnum hunting/hiking because he always 
takes a gun into the woods because he was "stopped several times by cougars and bears." (Tr., p.748, 
Ls.21-23; see a/so Tr., p.749, LS.17-24 (recounting a story about how he had a "cougar come running in 
on" him).) (Mr. Larsen's mention of bears was new at trial. At the first preliminary hearing, Mr. Larsen's 
stated reason for carrying a gun was his past experience with cougars: "Me and the wife was charged by 
a cougar one time." (First Prelim Tr. Vol. IV, p.423, Ls.21-25.) At the second preliminary hearing, 
Mr. Larsen simply explained: "I-I've been attacked, chased.")) He further claims that when he went into 
the woods on New Year's Eve Day, he was carrying his 14-inch long, three to four pound .44 Magnum 
(State's Ex. 149, the gun itself, has not been forwarded to the Supreme Court for obviOUS reasons; 
however, the specifications for Mr. Larsen's gun can be found at the Smith & Wesson website 
(http://www.smith-wesson.com)) in a fanny pack. (Tr., p.754, Ls.8-12, p.798, Ls.9-17; see also Tr., p.745, 
L.24 - p.746, L.3 (testifying that he "usually" carries his .44 Magnum in a fanny pack.) If that is, in fact, 
the case, Mr. Larsen must not only have a truly enormous fanny pack and a genuine affinity for being 
smacked in the midsection by hunk of metal every time he takes a step, but he must also be so foolish as 
to think that, with only one good arm, he can open a fanny pack, pull out a gun, aim, and fire, all before a 
stalking cougar (which probably has cat-like reflexes of its own) can pounce. 
Mr. Larsen also claims that upon returning home after hunting/hiking, he took the .44 Magnum out 
of his fanny pack and placed it under the front passenger seat of Mrs. Larsen's car, then brought the 
fanny pack inside. (Tr., p.754, Ls.11-16, p.754, L.22 - p.755, L.4.) Tellingly, Mr. Larsen's trial testimony 
is internally inconsistent on this point. On direct examination, he testified that he left the revolver in the 
Subaru because he thought he would be gOing hiking/hunting the following day. (Tr., p.754, Ls.12-14, 
p.754, L.25 - p.755, L.4.) However, on cross examination, he testified that he did so because that was "a 
norm." (Tr., p.845, L.9.) Moreover, putting the revolver under the seat of his wife's car would have been 
exceptionally odd because it would have resulted in his gun lying loose in a parked vehicle, where it 
would do nothing to assist him in protecting h is home or family should the need arise, where it could more 
easily be stolen; where it could end up being driven around (illegally, presumably) by Mrs. Larsen, Jovon, 
or Joleen and whomever they might have in the car with them; and because it is a $900+ gun 
(Tr., p.1302, L.25 - p.1303, L.1 ("I cannot imagine a thousand dollar gun put underneath seat[sic] .... "); 
Tr., p.1368, LS.5-11 (testifying that the .44 Magnum is not a cheap handgun); Attachment B (Smith & 
Wesson's speCifications for its Model 629 Classic Revolver with an 83/8 inch barrel)), which most people 
would not want banging around under the seat of a car. 
Finally, Mr. Larsen's story about reaching under the seat for the gun was proven to be false by 
the defense team investigator who discovered that, although the .44 Magnum does fit under the 
passenger seat in the Subaru, if it is placed under the seat, it slides all the way into the backseat and, 
more importantly, even if the gun was within reach, it cannot be retrieved while someone is Sitting in the 
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Mrs. Larsen then got out of the Subaru and sprinted toward their daughter's car, 
Mr. Larsen with .44 Magnum in hand. (Tr., p.773, L.23 - p.774, L.2.) Mr. Larsen 
testified that his intention at that point was to do whatever he had to do to stop 
Mr. Ellington. (See Tr., p.774, Ls.3-8, p.775, Ls.4-6.) He also testified that, from the 
time he got out of the Subaru, he fully intended to use his .44 Magnum. (Tr., p.81?, 
Ls.6-14, p.818, Ls.3-5.) 
As Mr. Larsen approached the back of the Blazer, Mr. Ellington was in the 
process of backing his Blazer up and disengaging from the Honda. (Tr., p.775, L.12 -
p.776, L.23.) As Mr. Larsen came around the passenger side of the Blazer, 
Mr. Ellington put his Blazer in drive as if to leave the scene going westbound; however, 
as he began to go forward, Mr. Larsen fired a shot that traveled through the front 
quarter panel of the Blazer. (Tr., p.776, L.25 - p.77?, L.1?, p.779, Ls.3-5, p.995, LS.12-
25.) Mr. Larsen testified that he leveled his gun at Mr. Ellington from right outside the 
passenger window (approximately four feet from Mr. Ellington's head) (Tr., p.77?, LS.20-
21, p.778, Ls.1-9, p.779, Ls.6-9, p.824, Ls.3-11), but that he ultimately did not fire from 
that angle because he was afraid he might miss and hit one of his daughters, and that, 
instead, he attempted to stop the Blazer by firing into the engine compartment. 
(Tr., p.??9, Ls.1-9, p.?80, Ls.4-15.) Of course, Mr. Ellington could not have known what 
passenger seat because the weight of that person would compress the seat down on top of the gun. 
(Compare Tr., p.847, LS.6-7 (Mr. Larsen testifying that he pulled the gun out from under the seat before 
he exited the Subaru) with Tr., p.1298, L.23 - p.1299, L.21 (Mark Durant, the defense investigator, 
testifying that the gun fit under the seat, but slid into the backseat, and that it is "absolutely, positively 
impossible to remove the weapon from underneath that when someone is seated on in.) 
The bottom line is that Mr. Larsen's story simply does not add up. Mr. Ellington submits that the 
truth is that the .44 Magnum was not in the Subaru by coincidence; Mr. Larsen grabbed it before heading 
out the door to meet his daughters. He further submits that Mr. Larsen did not have to reach under the 
seat to grab his gun because that gun was already in his hand. 
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Mr. Larsen's intent was. He would have just heard the blast,30 perhaps seen the gun in 
Mr. Larsen's hand,31 and probably felt the concussive force of the shot.32 As 
Mr. Ellington punched the gas, Mrs. Larsen, who had been running northward across 
the road directly in front of him, put her hands up and actually started to move back 
toward the middle of the road.33 (Tr., p.780, Ls.18-25, p.781, Ls.12-16.) Mr. Ellington 
did not stop, and he did not swerve radically.34 (Tr., p.917, Ls.7-9.) The front of the 
30 Major Dick Culver, the defense team's firearms expert, testified that the .44 Magnum is an extremely 
powerful weapon. As he explained to the jury, "[fjor those who are wondering what we're looking at, it's 
big." (Tr., p.1344, Ls.22-25.) He also testified that the.44 Magnum is extraordinarily loud. "The.44 is 
one of the more abusive weapons currently available as far as doing evil thing to your auditory nerves. 
They're powerful, they're very noisy. Yes, it's an experience." (Tr., p.1345, L.25 - p.1346, L.3; see a/so 
Tr., p.1349, Ls.4-10 (explaining that the .44 Magnum is "a lot" louder than a .38 caliber handgun).) 
31 Mr. Larsen went out of his way to emphasize his claim that Mr. Ellington was looking straight ahead, 
looking at Mrs. Larsen, throughout the time that Mr. Larsen was alongside the Blazer (see, e.g., 
Tr., p.,778, Ls.17-22, p.779, Ls.18-21, p.780, Ls.20-22, p.848, Ls.1-17, p.854, Ls.21-23), but even if 
Mr. Larsen's testimony was believable on this particular point, Mr. Ellington might have seen the gun in 
his peripheral vision at that time Oust as Mr. Larsen claims to have seen exactly what his wife was doing 
off to his right while he was focused on Mr. Ellington (see, e.g., Tr., p.778, L.23 - p.779, L.1, p.849, Ls.11-
15)) or, in one of his mirrors as Mr. Larsen approached the Blazer from behind. 
32 Dick Culver testified that the firing of a weapon comes with not only a loud sound and a potentially 
visible flash, but also a concussive blast, essentially a shockwave, that a bystander can feel. (See 
Tr., p.1346, Ls.4-17, p.1346, L.23 - p.1348, L. 1.) He further testified that the concussive blast will travel 
through glass and can be felt for up to approximately twenty feet from the muzzle of the weapon; thus, it 
could be felt inside a vehicle if the gun was fired nearby. (Tr., p.1370, L.6 - p.1373, L. 7, p. 1374, Ls.3-9.) 
33 Mr. Larsen asserts that his wife must have known she was not gOing to make it to the north shoulder of 
the road and, thus, tried to go back. (Tr., p.781, Ls.12-15, p.855, Ls.10-14.) However, what Mrs. Larsen 
was thinking in her final seconds of consciousness is pure speculation. Thus, it is equally plausible that 
she was actually trying to move into Mr. Ellington's path were her arms raised in an attempt to force him 
to stop. 
34 Mr. Larsen testified that, after backing away from the Honda such that the Blazer was pointed east 
southeast, Mr. Ellington turned left instead of driving diagonally into the eastbound lane. (See Tr., p. 781, 
Ls.3-8, p.854, L.24 - p.855, L.1); see a/so Exs. H & L (diagrams of crash scene showing acceleration 
marks curving around the back of the Honda).) This testimony is belied by the physical evidence, i.e., the 
acceleration marks that Mr. Ellington's Blazer left as he tried to flee the gunshots. Generally, these 
acceleration marks are straight (with an ever-so-slight leftward curve). From this (as well as Mr. Larsen's 
claim that Mr. Ellington was staring at his wife the whole time), Mr. Larsen clearly Wished for the jury to 
infer that Mr. Ellington was intentionally trying to hit Mrs. Larsen. (See Tr., p.780, 1.19 - p.781, L.11, 
p.854, L.20 - p.855, L.1.) In fact, he explicitly stated that opinion for the jury. (Tr., p.855, L.17.) 
However, there are actually a number of much more plaUSible explanations than that-Mr. Ellington was 
flinching in response to the report of Mr. Larsen's .44 Magnum; he was veering away from the man on his 
right who was shooting at him; he was trying to straighten the wheels out and simply overcorrected after 
making some fairly radical maneuvers under full acceleration; or, most likely, some combination of these. 
Indeed, even without taking into consideration the distraction of a man firing a powerful handgun, 
Dr. Skelton opined that, given the speed of the Blazer and the proximity of Mrs. Larsenr's body to the 
Honda, Mr. Ellington had not had time to perceive and react to Mrs. Larsen's presence. (Tr., p.1474, 
Ls.11-14.) And, in fact, although not actually admitted at trial, Exhibit 163-2, a recording of a telephone 
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Blazer struck Mrs. Larsen. (Tr., p.781, Ls.11-12.) The impact caused Mrs. Larsen's 
upper body to come down on top of the hood of the Blazer before she fell to the 
roadway. 35 (Tr., p.781, Ls.11-12, p.781, L.21 - p.782, L.3; cf. Tr., p.1466, LS.8-24 
(discussing the distance that Mrs. Larsen's body was carried by the front of the Blazer, 
even assuming it was not hung up on the hood of the vehicle).) When Mrs. Larsen did 
eventually fall all the way to the ground, the tires of the Blazer ran over her head and 
shoulders (Tr., p.782, L.22 - p.783, L.8), causing catastrophic injury (Tr., p.1254, L.1 -
p.1255, L.6, p.1257, L.22 - p.1258, L.12). The 9-1-1 recording indicates that one of the 
girls apparently reacted to Mrs. Larsen's being struck no more than six seconds after 
the Blazer had first collided with the Honda. (See Ex. 152, track 1 at 01:46 - 01:52.) 
Thus, if Mr. Ellington was to have avoided Mrs. Larsen, he likely had no more than six 
seconds to: attempt to disengage from the Honda while still moving forward; failing that, 
stop his forward motion and put the Blazer in reverse; back up a sufficient distance to 
be clear of the Honda; shift into drive again; and, in proceeding forward amid gunfire, 
perceive and react to Mrs. Larsen's presence. (See Ex. 152, track 1 at 01 :46 - 01 :52.) 
conversation Mr. Ellington had with his fiancee, Ann Thomas, while he was in the Kootenai County Jail, 
shows that Mr. Ellington did not even have time to perceive the fact that the person he struck was a 
woman: 
Jonathon Ellington: It's bullshit gettin' locked up for gettin' shot at. You know? I don't 
even know who these people were. 
Ann Thomas: They said it was a lady. 
J.E.: Was it? 
A.T.: Yeah. 
J.E.: Well I don't know. God, I got people shootin' at me from behind and, you know, 
Jesus Christ. Wasn't like I was trying to stop to see who's shootin'. 
~Ex.163-2 at 04:03 - 04:26.) 
5 The fact that much of Mrs. Larsen's upper body hit the hood of the Blazer is significant because it 
logically supports Dr. Skelton's opinion that Mrs. Larsen had been carried down the roadway by the force 
of the impact at the same time that gravity acted to pull her body to the ground (accord Tr., p.392, Ls.3-6 
(Joleen testifying that Mrs. Larsen "was pushed, she didn't fall straight down")) (and it rebuts the State's 
theory that Mrs. Larsen was thrown to the ground by the impact (see Tr., p.1675, Ls.10-13)), thereby 
evidencing the fact that she was actually struck much closer to the Honda than the final resting place of 
her body would indicate and, thereby, shortening the amount of time that Mr. Ellington had to react 
between the gunshot and his collision with Mrs. Larsen. 
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After Mr. Ellington struck Mrs. Larsen and fled eastbound on Scarcello, 
Mr. Larsen ran behind him, firing his .44 Magnum at least once more.36 (Tr., p.784, 
Ls.11-23.) Immediately afterward, rather than comforting his dying wife,37 Mr. Larsen's 
first reaction was to go stash the gun in the Subaru.38 (Tr., p.401, Ls.13-21, p.784, L.11 
- p.735, L.11, p.789, L.25 - p.790, L.20.) Approximately two minutes later, Deputy 
Klinkefus, who had been trailing the chase the whole time, but who had been unable to 
36 It is undisputed that Mr. Larsen fired five rounds total. (See Tr., p.754, Ls.15-21 (testifying that there 
had been five live rounds in the gun at the outset of the incident), p.1119, LS.3-9 (testifying that after the 
incident, the gun contained five spent shell casings).) Originally, Mr. Larsen told the police that he had 
not fired at all until after his wife had been struck. (Tr., p.1118, Ls.7-18; Ex. 147 at 12:47:59 - 12:48:40.) 
However, he later admitted to the shot fired after Mr. Ellington backed away from the Honda (see, e.g., 
p.779, Ls.3-5 (testifying that he did shoot at the Blazer prior to his wife being struck», although he still 
maintained that the other four shots were fired as Mr. Ellington fled (Tr., p.784, L.13, p.826, Ls.23-24). 
Interestingly, the microphone on Joleen's cell phone should have picked up all of the gunshots fired at the 
scene (Ex. J (letter from Motorola, Inc., to Sgt. Brad Maskell of the Kootenai County Sheriffs Office)), yet 
only two shots are audible on the enhanced 9-1-1 recording. (Compare Tr., p.478, p.16 - p.479, L.11, 
p.484, L.20 - p.485, L.4,. p.508, Ls.13-22 (testimony of State's witness that gunshots can be categorized 
as "percussive incidents," that he isolated five "percussive incidents" on the enhanced 9-1-1 recording, 
but that he could not opine as to whether any of those percussive incidents were actually gunshots) with 
Tr., p.1599, L.12 - p.1601, L.21 (testimony of defense witness who opined that only two of the five 
percussive inCidents were gunshots).) In addition, Joleen testified that the only shot she ever heard was 
a shot fired after Mrs. Larsen had been run over. (Tr., p.441 , Ls.6-10.) (Jovon testified at trial that she 
saw her father fire at Mr. Ellington, but that she could not remember hearing any shots and did not know 
how many times she saw him fire. (Tr., p.1212, Ls.2-7, p.1217, Ls.18-24.) She had previously testified 
that she remembered her father shooting twice, but by the time of trial, she said that two shots would be 
nothing more than a guess. (Tr., p.1217, L.25 - p.1218, L.8; see also First Prelim. Tr. Vol. I, p.123, Ls.4-
14 ("1 heard like the last two, but I don't remember anymore than that,").» Accordingly, one must wonder 
if Mr. Larsen has been totally truthful or, perhaps, he had fired at Mr. Ellington even before trying to block 
him in with the Subaru. 
37 Mr. Larsen testified that there was no reason to be with his wife, as "[s]he was obviously dead." 
(Tr., p.859, L.5.) However, Trooper Klinkefus testified that Mrs. Larsen was still showing some fleeting 
signs of life when he arrived a few minutes later (see Tr., p.1141, LS.5-12, p.1149, L.20 - p.1150, L.11), 
and that she was his priority at the scene: "At that time I basically just stayed with Vonette. It was my 
opinion that she was the priority at the scene, and until medical got there I was going to stay with her." 
iTr., p.1109, L.25 - p.1110, L.3.) 
8 Mr. Ellington is not unmindful of the political incorrectness of challenging the veracity and integrity of a 
grieving widower. However, Mr. Larsen's testimony smacks of deception and the reality is that Mr. Larsen 
had incentive to testify falsely. First, it was financially beneficial to blame others-namely Mr. Ellington 
and Deputy Klinkefus-for what happened to his wife. (See Ex. A (Notice of Tort Claim (for $1 million) 
filed by the surviving Larsen family members against Kootenai County).) Second, it was in his penal 
interest to portray Mr. Ellington as the culpable party, i.e., the aggressor. (See Tr., p.841, L.20 - p.842, 
L. 18 (discussing the fact that, in an early interview with the police, Mr. Larsen expressed concern that he 
would be the one going to jail).) Third, and most importantly, emotionally and psychology, it was 
undoubtedly easier to blame Mr. Ellington than to take responsibility for his role in causing his wife's 
death. 
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catch up, arrived on-scene (see Ex. 151, track 3 at 04:02) and attempted to render aid 
to Mrs. Larsen, who, despite her horrific injuries, still showed some signs of life-some 
body movement, as if she was struggling to breathe. (Tr., p.1141, Ls.5-12.) Ultimately 
though, Mrs. Larsen could not be revived. (Tr., p.585, L.19 '- p.586, L.2.) 
In the meantime, after fleeing, Mr. Ellington had gone back to Ron Cunningham's 
home. (See Tr., p.1069, L.5 - p.107i, L.i6.) Before too long though, his Blazer was 
spotted by police officers driving by on Scarcello and those officers stopped at the 
Cunningham residence. (Tr., p.i079, L.17 - p.1081, L.13, p.1071, Ls.i0-i6.) When 
they arrived, Mr. Ellington went out to meet them and, when asked whether anything 
had happened earlier, he immediately offered to show the officers the bullet holes in his 
Blazer.39 (Tr., p.i081, Ls.17-20, p.i084, Ls.19-2i.) As soon as he made that offer, he 
was arrested. (Tr., p.1084, Ls.22-25.) 
Mr. Ellington was initially charged, on January 3, 2006 in Kootenai County Case 
No. CR-F06-0033, with a single count of second degree murder and two counts of 
aggravated battery (one each for Jovon and Jolene for colliding with the Honda) and, in 
Part " of the complaint, with a deadly weapon enhancement. (Complaint-Criminal, 
Kootenai County Case No. CR-F06-0033 (Jan. 3, 2006).)40 Following a lengthy 
preliminary hearing though, Judge Marano refused to bind Mr. Ellington over as 
charged. (See First Prelim. Tr. Vol. IV, p.501, L.i - p.503, L.17.) With regard to the 
murder charge, he concluded "that there is certainly not sufficient evidence ... to show 
39 Other than the bullet hole in his front quarter panel, there was a second mark where a bullet had 
~Ianced off one his windows. (Tr., p.998, Ls.6-19.) 
o Relevant portions of the record from Kootenai County Case No. CR-F06-0033 are attached to 
Mr. Ellington's Motion to Augment Record, which is filed contemporaneously herewith. All citations to the 
record in that case are identified by use of the Kootenai County case number. However, as noted above, 
all citations to the preliminary hearing in that case are identified through the prefix "First. Prelim. Tr." 
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expressed [sic] malice" (First Prelim. Tr. Vol. IV, p.501, Ls.5-9), and, furthermore, that 
he could not even find "implied malice in this particular case" (First Prelim. Tr. Vol. IV, 
p.501, L 24 - p.502, L.1). Judge Marano, also concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Ellington intentionally cOllided with the girls' Honda. 
(First Prelim. Tr. Vol. IV, p.503, Ls.4-14.) However, he did bind Mr. Ellington over on 
involuntary manslaughter and four counts of aggravated assault (two each for Jovon 
and Jolene for having backed up toward them on Brunner road during the first chase, 
and then driving toward them in their lane of travel on Seasons Road, also during the 
first chase). (First Prelim. Tr. Vol. IV, p.502, Ls.2-24.) That was not satisfactory to the 
prosecution though, so the State sought, and received, dismissal of Kootenai County 
Case No. CR-F06-0033,41 and, on January 27, 2006, it re-filed the original charges 
under a new case (Kootenai County Case No. CR-F06-1497). (R. Vol. I, pp.35-37.) 
The second time around, the State drew a magistrate, Judge Simpson, who was 
far more receptive to the State's version of the facts, and, on February 16, 2006, 
Mr. Ellington was bound over on all of the State's charges. (R. Vol. I, p.121; Second 
Prelim. Tr. Vol. V, p.600, L.6 - p.608, L.7; see a/so R. Vol. I, pp.127-29 (Information).) 
Judge Simpson faulted Mr. Ellington for: not stopping when he skidded into the 
41 The State moved to dismiss the involuntary manslaughter charge on January 26, 2006. (Motion to 
Dismiss the Charge of Involuntary Manslaughter, Kootenai County Case No, CR-F06-0033 (Jan, 26, 
2006),) That motion was granted the following day, Order to Dismiss the Charge of Involuntary 
Manslaughter, Kootenai County Case No, CR-F06-0033 (Jan, 27, 2006),) However, that order of 
dismissal was set aside in response to a defense motion (Court Minutes for Motion Hearing Held Feb, 3, 
2006, Kootenai County Case No, CR-F06-0033 (not file-stamped); see a/so Motion to Set Aside Order of 
Dismissal, Kootenai County Case No, CR-F06-0033 (Jan, 27, 2006))), Ultimately though, the State 
moved for dismissal of the involuntary manslaughter charge again (Second Motion to Dismiss Charge of 
Involuntary Manslaughter, Kootenai County Case No, CR-F06-0033 (Feb, 3, 2006)) and, eventually the 
aggravated assault charges (Motion to Dismiss, Kootenai County Case No, CR-F06-0033 (May 31, 
2006); Tr., P,g, Ls,1-19), and both motions were granted by the district court, (Second Order to Dismiss 
Charge of Involuntary Manslaughter, Kootenai County Case No, CR-F06-0033 (Feb, 3, 2006); Order to 
Dismiss, Kootenai County Case No, CR-F06-0033 (June 6,2006); Tr" p,9, L23 - p,10, L2,) 
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snowbank and his pursuers used their vehicles to block the road; not stopping or 
leaving the scene after "he hit" the front of Mrs. Larsen's Subaru with the side of his 
Blazer; not stopping or carefully avoiding Mrs. Larsen after hitting the Honda and while 
being fired upon; and not stopping while Mr. Larsen supposedly emptied his .44 
Magnum at him after he hit Mrs. Larsen. (See Second Prelim. Tr. Vol. V, p.607, Ls.5-
22.) Thus, Judge Simpson concluded that, in the few short seconds during which 
Mr. Ellington backed away from the Honda, put his Blazer in drive, and started 
accelerating under fire from Mr. Larsen's .44 Magnum, he probably "formed a deliberate 
intention to kill" Mrs. Larsen (Second Prelim. Tr. Vol. V, p.605, Ls.15-20), and "it's more 
likely than not Mr. Ellington was in a rage and was trying to hurt or kill Jovon, Joleen 
and Mrs. Larsen" (Second Prelim. Tr. Vol. V, p.607, Ls.23-25). 
On March 23, 2006, pursuant to I.C. § 19-815A, Mr. Ellington filed a Motion to 
Dismiss on the basis that the evidence adduced at the second preliminary hearing was 
insufficient to justify holding him for trial. (R. Vol. I, p.142; see also R. Vol. I, pp.171-87 
(memorandum in support of motion); Tr., p.9, L.8 - p.45, L.3 (hearing on motion).) In 
reviewing Mr. Ellington's motion, the district court recognized that it was to evaluate 
Judge Simpson's decision for an abuse of discretion. (See R. Vol. I, p.213 ("The role of 
the District Court in reviewing the magistrate's findings at preliminary hearing is not to 
substitute this court's judgment of the facts presented"); Tr., p.41, Ls.1-3 ("The standard 
is not a requirement or is not a situation where this court simply second-guesses what 
the magistrate did with the evidence."), p.43, Ls.11-16 ("1 think the duty of this court is to 
simply examine the evidence and make a determination as to whether or not there is no 
reasonable way to look or view the evidence to come up with a conclusion that Judge 
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Simpson came up with. I think that certainly is a difficult burden to meet on a 19-815(a) 
[sic] challenge.,,).)42 Given this standard of review, the district court was constrained to 
rule in the State's favor. (R. Vol. I, p.215.) However, the district court also noted that 
the State's evidence was far from overwhelming: "Certainly a serious question is 
present in this case as to whether Ellington was trying to escape a volatile situation or 
whether he intentionally brought harm to the girls or acted willfully in crashing into their 
car. In this court's opinion that is a question for a jury to resolve." (R. Vol. I, p.215.) 
Later, the district court again hinted at its opinion that the State's case was thin. 
At the August 10, 2006 pretrial conference, after inquiring as to the status of plea 
negotiations and being told by the prosecutor that a deal was unlikely because "Joel 
Larsen . . . does not want to see anything less than a murder charge go to trial in this 
case" (Tr., p.68, L.15 - p.69, L.5), the district court offered its opinion that perhaps 
Mr. Larsen's opinion should not control because "I had an opportunity to review the 
facts of this case rather extensively and, quite frankly, I think that there are some 
problems, both legal problems and factual problems for the state to be able to ultimately 
prove the charges alleged.,,43 (Tr., p.69, Ls.6-13.) 
On August 22, 2006, jury selection began. (See generally R. Vol. I, pp.246-52; 
Supp. Tr.; Tr., p.98, L.1 - p.110, L.23.) The following day, both parties made their 
opening statements and the State began presenting its case-in-chief. (See generally 
R. Vol. I, pp.252-67; Tr., p.111, L.1 - p.279, L.20.) The State presented its case for 
42 The abuse of discretion standard utilized by the district court was the correct standard. State v. 
O'Mea/ey, 95 Idaho 202,204,506 P.2d 99,101 (1973). 
43 The district court also painted out that Mr. Ellington's defense faced problems of its own and, thus, 
Mr. Ellington ought not to hold out for an offer of only misdemeanors. (Tr., p.69, Ls.14-21.) 
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portions of seven days, before resting on the morning of August 31,2006. (Tr., p.1261, 
L.16.) 
After the State rested, the defense moved, pursuant to I.C.R. 29, for an acquittal 
on all charges. (Tr., p.1263, L.23 - p.1268, L.1.) The district court denied that motion in 
large part, but granted it as to the "express malice" theory of second degree murder. 
(Tr., p.1276, L.25 - p.1277, L.11.) In other words, the district court concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Mr. Ellington had 
intended to kill Mrs. Larsen and, thus, it would only instruct the jury as to the "implied 
malice" prong of the definition of "malice aforethought." (See Tr., p.1269, L.19 - p.1277, 
L.11; see also Jury Instruction No. 16 (defining malice aforethought).) 
The defense then presented its case-in-chief over the course of three days, 
before resting on September 5, 2006. (Tr., p.1651, L.20.) On September 5 and 6, 
2006, the jury heard from one rebuttal witness for the State, and one surrebuttal witness 
from the defense. (See general/yTr, p.1651, L.21 - p.1719, L.21.) After receiving its 
final instructions and hearing closing arguments, the jury began its deliberations at 3:20 
p.m. on September 6,2006. (R. Vol. II, p.378; Tr., p.1784, L.3.) However, the jurors 
could not reach a unanimous verdict that evening, so the deliberations were adjourned 
for the night. (See Tr., p.1785, L.1 - p.1788, L.8.) On the following day, September 7, 
2006, the jury deliberated for some seven more hours before finally arriving at verdicts 
of guilty on all charges. (See Tr., p.1789, L.1 - p.1795, L.25; see also R. Vol. II, pp.379-
80 (verdict form).) 
On December 4, 2006, the district court imposed upon Mr. Ellington concurrent 
sentences 25 years, with 12 years fixed (for second degree murder), and fifteen years, 
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with seven years fixed (for each count of aggravated battery). (R. Vol. II, pp.420, 428; 
Tr., p.1846, L.22 - p.1847, L.2.) The district court filed its Judgment and Sentence ten 
days later, on December 14, 2006. (R. Vol. II, pp.427-29.) 
On January 4, 2007, Mr. Ellington timely filed a Notice of Appeal.44 (R. Vol. II, 
pp.432-34.) On appeal, Mr. Ellington contends that his conviction was a result of bias 
and prejudice, not a reasoned consideration of the evidence. Specifically, Mr. Ellington 
asserts that: (1) as part of a much larger pattern of trying to prejudice the jury, the 
State, with prosecutor Arthur Verharen at the helm, committed four distinct acts of 
misconduct; (2) the district court erred in admitting certain highly prejudicial information; 
and (3) the entire panel of prospective jurors was tainted by comments made by three of 
their peers. In addition, Mr. Ellington contends that there was such an accumulation of 
errors in this case that he was denied a fair trial. Accordingly, Mr. Ellington respectfully 
requests that his conviction and sentence be vacated, and that his case be remanded 
for a new trial. 
44 On March 2, 2007, Mr. Ellington filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. (R. Vol. II, pp.441-46.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the State engage in numerous acts of misconduct which, when considered in 
context, render Mr. Ellington's trial so fundamentally unfair that he is now entitled 
to a new trial? 
2. Did the district court err in admitting certain highly prejudicial evidence? 
3. Is Mr. Ellington entitled to a new trial based on the fact that the entire panel of 
prospective jurors in his case was tainted by three prospective jurors who 
expressed their opinions that he was guilty? 




The State Engaged In Numerous Acts Of Misconduct Which, When Considered In 
Context, Rendered Mr. Ellington's Trial Fundamentally Unfair And, Thus, Necessitate A 
New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ellington contends that his right to a fair trial,45 his right to due process of 
law,46 and his right to silence,47 were all abridged through various instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct in this case. He asserts that there were four specific 
instances of misconduct-a comment on his silence and three blatant appeals to the 
emotions of the jurors. 
Mr. Ellington further contends that these four instances of misconduct were just a 
small part of a much larger, systematic effort by the prosecutor, Arthur Verharen, to 
obtain a conviction by prejudicing the jury with extraneous information. Mr. Ellington 
asserts that in an extremely close case such is this-one which could have just as 
easily ended in an acquittal as in a conviction-such systematic attempts to influence 
the jury by bias and emotion, rather than the actual evidence, are certainly prejudicial to 
the defendant and a new trial is required. 
45 See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I § 13. 
46 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I § 13. 
47 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I § 13. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Because Mr. Ellington not only objected to each of the four instances of 
misconduct in question, but also moved for a mistrial in each case, the applicable 
standard of review is as follows: 
When there is a motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial error 
supported by a contemporaneous objection to the underlying procedural 
or evidentiary error we review the denial of a motion for mistrial for 
reversible error. 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge 
reasonably exercised his discretion in light of circumstances 
existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the 
question must be whether the event which precipitated the 
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed 
in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for 
mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of 
discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is 
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to 
declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, 
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error. 
When there has been a contemporaneous objection we determine 
factually if there was prosecutorial misconduct, then we determine 
whether the error was harmless. 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273,285 (2007) (citations omitted). 
C. The State Engaged In Numerous Acts Of Misconduct 
1. Misconduct Occurred When The Prosecutor Elicited Testimony From The 
Lead Police Detective Which Allowed The Jury To Draw A Negative 
Inference From Mr. Ellington's Post-Miranda Silence 
Pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, as well as Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, no person may be 
compelled, in any criminal case, to be made a witness against himself. The essence of 
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this mandate, of course, is that, where the government "proposes to convict and punish 
an individual," it must "produce the evidence against him by the independent labor of its 
officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips." Culombe v. 
Connecticut, 357 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961). Thus, suspects in criminal cases have a 
constitutional right to remain silent. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-69 
(1966) (recognizing that such a right exists in holding that, under certain circumstances, 
the suspect must also be "informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right 
to remain silent"). 
Not only do suspects have a right to remain silent though; they also have a right 
not to have their silence used against them at trial. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 
617-19 (1976) (holding that a defendant who testifies in his own defense cannot be 
cross-examined about his post-arrest silence); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 612-
15 (1965) (holding that no comment may be made upon a defendant's exercise of his 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right not to testify). Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has recognized that, "[ilf a prosecutor is allowed to introduce evidence of silence, for 
any purpose, then the right to remain silent guaranteed in Miranda v. Arizona . . . 
becomes so diluted as to be rendered worthless." State v. White, 97 Idaho 708,714-15, 
551 P.2d 1344, 1350-51 (1976) (emphasis added). 
Based on the foregoing authorities, the Idaho courts have consistently held that it 
is improper for the State to draw attention to the defendant's post-Miranda silence 
because its doing so runs the risk that the jury will draw an inference of guilt from the 
defendant's exercise of his constitutionally-protected right. See, e g., State v. Lopez, 
141 Idaho 575, 577-79, 114 P.3d 133, 135-37 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding fundamental, 
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reversible error where the defendant was cross-examined regarding his post-Miranda 
silence, a detective was questioned about the defendant's post-Miranda silence, and, 
during the State's closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury to infer the 
defendant's guilt from his post-Miranda silence); State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296, 298-
99, 62 P.2d 644, 646-47 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding error where the prosecutor asked a 
police officer if he had arrested the defendant and the officer responded with: "I 
Mirandized him at that point. He refused to say anything"); State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 
709, 711-14, 992 P .2d 158, 160-63 (1999) (finding fundamental, reversible error where 
the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant at great length regarding his silence and 
then argued that such silence was indicative of the defendant's guilt); State v. Martinez, 
128 Idaho 104, 111-12,910 P.2d 776, 783-84 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding error where the 
prosecutor asked a police detective what investigative steps he had taken to obtain 
physical evidence and the detective replied: "I wanted to talk with him about what had 
happened from his perspective. However, he chose not to talk to me"); State v. Po/and, 
116 Idaho 34, 36-37, 773 P.2d 651, 653-54 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding fundamental, 
reversible error where the prosecutor elicited testimony from the prosecution's 
investigator to the effect that the defendant had participated in an interview, but had 
terminated that interview when she got to "the very end of the story and what happened 
at the incident time and directly thereafter"). 
Mr. Ellington submits that the present case is no different than the cases 
discussed above. In this case, while Mr. Verharen questioned the lead detective, 
Sergeant Brad Maskell of the Kootenai County Sheriffs Department, about his arrival at 
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the Cunningham residence, and after asking Detective Maskell to identify Mr. Ellington 
as having been present there, the following exchanged occurred: 
Q. At the time that you got there and he was in the back of that 
patrol car, was he under arrest? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so you did not interview him? 
A. I attempted to. 
(Tr., p.236, Ls.3-7 (emphasis added).) At that point, defense counsel asked for a bench 
conference whereupon he apparently asked to be heard outside the presence of the 
jury. (See Tr., p.236, Ls.8-19.) After the jury had exited, defense counsel, citing Doyle, 
numerous constitutional provisions, and Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1, moved for a mistrial 
on the basis that Detective Maskell's testimony was an impermissible comment on 
Mr. Ellington's silence, and that such comment would lead the jurors naturally to draw 
an Improper inference of Mr. Ellington's guilt. (Tr., p.236, L.20 - p.238, L.20; see also 
Tr., p.240, L.16 - p.241, L.8 (rebuttal argument).) 
Mr. Verharen responded to defense counsel's motion by arguing that he did not 
intend to have Detective Maskell comment on Mr. Ellington's silence, and, in fact, had 
asked Detective Maskell leading questions for the specific purpose of avoiding a 
comment-on-silence problem. (Tr., p.238, L.23 - p.239, L.15, p.239, Ls.18-19.) He 
also argued briefly that "I don't think his response here makes inference to the jury [sic] 
that he invoked his right to counsel. I don't think it has gone that far." (Tr., p.239, 
Ls.17-18.) 
Although the district court noted that "this is an area of concern," it ultimately 
denied the motion for a mistrial. (Tr., p.246, L.15 - p.247, L.3.) In so doing, it observed 
that Mr. Verharen's question "might have been totally avoided," but, because Detective 
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Maskell did not directly answer Mr. Verharen's question, Detective Maskell was partly 
responsible for causing the problem and, thus, there was no "direct effort on the part of 
the state to in fact elicit that inference" and there was not a sufficient "showing to satisfy 
the court that it was the government's manifest intention" to comment on Mr. Ellington's 
silence. (Tr., p.244, L.2 - p.245, L.12.) In addition, the district court determined that 
Detective Maskell's testimony was only an "indirect" reference to Mr. Ellington's silence 
because, although the jury could interpret Detective Maskell's testimony as relating to 
Mr. Ellington's invocation of his rights, it would not "naturally and necessarily" do so and, 
thus, it would be a "quantum leap" for the district court to conclude that the jury would 
"infer that somehow Mr. Ellington had invoked his right to remain silent and that is why 
the attempt to conduct an interview was not accomplished.,,48 (Tr., p.244, L.15 - p.246, 
L.14.) 
Notwithstanding the district court's ruling, Mr. Ellington contends that the State 
engaged in misconduct and that, as a result, he is entitled to a new trial. Clearly, 
Detective Maskell's testimony was a comment on Mr. Ellington's silence for which the 
natural concem is that the jury would draw an inference of guilt.49 Thus, under c1early-
established law, there was certainly error. The only remaining question, then, is 
48 The district court also apparently found it significant that there was no evidence as to whether 
Mr. Ellington had been Mirandized prior to refusing to speak to Detective Maskell. However, that 
concern, obviously derived from State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575,578, 114 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that fundamental error could not be found on appeal where it was unclear whether the testimony 
had commented on pre-Miranda or post-Miranda silence), was misplaced since, unlike, the defendant in 
Lopez, here, Mr. Ellington was quite obviously in custOdy and, at the very least, should have been given a 
Miranda warning. In addition, in his oral motion for a mistrial, defense counsel had specifically 
represented that Mr. Ellington had, in fact, been Mirandized. (Tr., p.237, Ls.2-6.) 
49 The district court's focus on whether the jury would realize that the basis for Mr. Ellington not having 
spoken to Detective Maskell was because he had invoked his right to silence completely misses the point. 
The concern in any comment-on-silence case is not that the jury will recognize that the defendant 
exercised his rights, but that it will infer guilt from his silence. 
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whether that error rose to the level of reversible error or whether it was harmless. 
Mr. Ellington asserts that the error was not harmless. 
Although the prejudicial effect of all of the alleged misconduct in this case is 
discussed in detail in Part 1(0), below, there is one fact which is specific to this particular 
instance of misconduct and counsels toward reversal: there was absolutely no reason 
for Detective Maskell's failed attempt to interview Mr. Ellington to have been brought out 
by the State, except to have the jurors infer Mr. Ellington's guilt. As even the district 
court seems to have observed, Mr. Verharen had no reason go down the road of asking 
Detective Maskell whether he attempted to interview Mr. Ellington. (See Tr., p.244, 
Ls.2-6.) Thus, Mr. Verharen's claim that he attempted to avoid the comment-on-silence 
problem by asking leading questions (Tr., p.238, L.23 - p.239, L.19) rings quite hollow. 
Moreover, even if the comment on Mr. Ellington's silence was primarily Detective 
Maskell's fault, not Mr. Verharen's, the reality is that Detective Maskell is a 
representative of the State, just as Mr. Verharen is (Tr., p.207, Ls.22-23), and, more 
importantly, with his years of experience as a police officer (see Tr., p.207, L.21 -
p.208, L.20, p.209, L.20 - p.210, LA) and copious training, including POST 
certifications at the most advanced levels (see Tr., p.208, L.21 - p.209, L.19), he knew, 
or should have known, better than to have made the comment that he did. 
2. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Seeking To Inflame The 
Passions And Prejudices Of The Jurv By Eliciting Testimony About How 
The Facts Of The Present Case So Disturbed One Of The State's 
Witnessed That He Had To Change Jobs 
It is well-established that any prosecutorial appeal to convict a defendant based 
upon passion or prejudice, as opposed to the evidence properly before the jury, 
constitutes misconduct. See, e.g., State v. Beebe, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d _, 2007 WL 
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2377331, *5 (Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2007) ("Urgings, explicit or implied, for the jury to render 
a verdict based on factors other than the evidence admitted at trial and the law 
contained in the jury instructions have no place in closing arguments."); State v. Phillips, 
144 Idaho 82,87, 156 P.3d 583,588 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[A]ppeals to emotion, passion or 
prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible."); State v. 
Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 819, 839 P.2d 1223, 1233 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting that it is 
improper for a prosecutor to ask a question of a victim in order to generate sympathy for 
that victim); Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628, 648, 769 P.2d 505, 525 (1989) ("It is 
generally recognized that the 'golden rule' argument, by which counsel suggests the 
jurors place themselves in the position of the party, is reversibly improper because it is 
an invitation to ignore jury instructions and decide the case by sympathy."). 
In this case, Mr. Verharen made just such an appeal when he engaged in the 
following (interrupted) dialogue with Eric Hartmann, the individual retained by the State 
to prepare an "enhanced" version of Joleen's second 9-1-1 call: 
Q. And at some point you worked on a 911 call that involves this 
matter? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Can you tell us, please, why you only worked at RMIN for two 
months? 
A. The simple answer is this case in particular left me with the 
inability to sleep and I decided thaf.-
MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection, Your Honor, relevance, move to strike 
and admonish the jury not to consider that. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
A. So I had some trouble with this case. 
THE COURT: Hold, we're going to wait for another question, thank 
you. 
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Q. (By Mr. Verharen) After you worked on this particular recording 
you decided not to work for RMIN anymore? 
A. That's correct. 
MR SCHWARTZ: Objection, Your Honor, relevance. 
THE COURT: I'll let that response stand.5o 
(Tr., p.525, L.13 - p.526, L.5 (emphasis added).) Notably, Mr. Verharen knew full well 
what Mr. Hartmann was going to say when he asked the above questions. (Tr., p.540, 
L.25 - p.541, L.12, p.543, Ls.6-8.) 
Based upon Mr. Verharen's questioning of Mr. Hartmann, during the next recess, 
defense counsel once again moved for a mistrial. (Tr., p.540, Ls.19-20, p.541 , L.17-
p.543, L.3.) Counsel argued that, because the question of why Mr. Hartmann left his 
employment with RMIN was obviously irrelevant, it is clear Mr. Verharen's purpose was 
to elicit testimony which would remind the "jury how awful this case is" and, thereby, 
inflame the passions and prejudices of the individual jurors. (Tr., p.542, L.17 - p.542, 
L.7.) Counsel also argued that the prejudicial effect of Mr. Verharen's actions were 
compounded by the fact that this was not the first instance of misconduct in trying to 
manipulate the jurors' emotions. (Tr., p.542, L.8 - p.543, L.1.) 
In response, Mr. Verharen claimed that he was not trying to prejudice the jury; he 
said he was merely trying to rebut the anticipated impeachment of his witness: "It was 
because I figured, and it's proven to be true, that his testimony was going to be highly 
50 Mr. Ellington does not specifically appeal the district court's overruling of his relevance objection in this 
instance because, although he contends the testimony elicited was, in fact, irrelevant, it had already been 
heard by the jury and Mr. Ellington had already been prejudiced. Moreover, this question is subsumed by 
his claim that the district court should have granted his subsequent motion for a mistrial based on the 





contested, and that every effort was going to be made to not have this witness testify 
and/or impeach him when he testified." (Tr., p.543, Ls.6-23.) 
In reply, defense counsel pointed out that Mr. Verharen's claim-that "it's proven 
to be true, that his testimony was gOing to be highly contested, and that every effort was 
going to be made to not have this witness testify and/or impeach him when he 
testified"-was patently false, as the defense had not yet cross-examined 
Mr. Hartmann. (Tr., p.543, L.25 - p.544, L.5.) Counsel also reiterated his argument 
that Mr. Verharen was obviously trying to prejudice the jury, and that such misconduct 
was preventing Mr. Ellington from receiving a fair trial. (Tr., p.544, Ls.6-23.) 
The district court concluded that the testimony in question "was unnecessarily 
elicited here from the witness" (Tr., p.545, Ls.16-17) and that the State's effort to 
"bring[ ] out Mr. Hartmann's disturbing reflection on this case ... simply doesn't have a 
place in this case" (Tr., p.547, Ls.21-23). The district court also admonished 
Mr. Verharen to focus on the evidence: 
This case needs to be tried on the facts, the circumstances that 
took place, and it shouldn't be tried and determined based upon some 
type of emotional loss that these young girls and their father have 
experienced [or] upon the gravity of the circumstance that took place and 
the emotions that were involved, it should be determined on the facts and 
the law that ultimately will be applicable to this case . 
. .. I'm starting to become a little bit concerned because I think that 
the state needs to focus not on issues that would bear upon the prejudice 
of the jury but upon the facts of this particular case .... 
And I think that can be done without focusing on these emotional 
issues and some of these other graphic details .... 51 
51 Astonishingly, Mr. Verharen paid the district court's admonishment absolutely no heed. When the 
State's very next witness, Anthony Hutchinson, one of the firefighter EMTs who had attempted to render 
aid to Mrs. Larsen, testified that he was no longer an EMT, Mr. Verharen asked him when he resigned 
and, upon learning that he had resigned in April 2006 Oust four months after the incident at issue in this 
case), asked: "And the reason you resigned?" (Tr., p.581, L.23 - p.582, LA) This time, however, 
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(Tr., p.547, L.24 - p.548, L.18.) Nevertheless, the district court declined to find any 
prosecutorial misconduct on Mr. Verharen's part, and it denied the motion for a mistrial. 
(Tr., p.544, L24 - p.549, L.2.) 
Mr. Ellington contends that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for 
a mistrial. As even the district court noted, there was absolutely no proper purpose for 
Mr. Verharen to have posed the question that he did (Tr., p.545, Ls.16-17, p.547, LS.21-
23). Moreover, as the district court seems to have also recognized, Mr. Verharen's 
tactics smacked of an improper attempt to once again influence the jury with an 
emotional appeal. (See Tr., p.547, L.24 - p.548, L.18.) In light of these realities, 
Mr. Ellington submits that Mr. Verharen engaged in misconduct of the kind which has 
been expressly prohibited in cases like Phillips, Peite, and Robertson. 
3. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Seeking To Inflame The 
Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury Through Gratuitous Use Of The 
Phrases "Running Over Your Wife" And "Ran Over Your Wife" 
Just as Mr. Verharen sought to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury by 
having Mr. Hartmann testify as to how troubled he was by the horrific circumstances of 
this case, so too did he attempt to inflame their passions and prejudices by presenting 
gratuitous reminders of: (a) the gruesome manner of Mrs. Larsen's death, and (b) the 
fact that Mrs. Larsen was someone's wife and mother. Over the course of three 
consecutive questions (presented to Mr. Larsen during direct examination), 
Mr. Verharen uttered the phrases "running over your wife" and "ran over your wife" no 
less than four times: 
defense counsel was ready, and was able to object before the witness could answer. (Tr., p.582, L.3.) 
Obviously, the objection was sustained. (Tr., p.582, L.4.) 
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Q. After he got done running over your wife, was he still in the 
wrong lane of travel there? 
A. After he came back into the correct lane and continued, then left. 
Q. How long after-he ran over your wife in the wrong lane of 
travel, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. After he got done running over your wife, when did he get back 
in the correct lane of travel to go eastbound on Scarcello? How long after 
he got done running over her was it that he got back into the correct lane? 
(Tr., p.783, Ls.13-23.) 
After the fourth consecutive reference to Mr. Larsen's wife having been run over, 
defense counsel objected, arguing that Mr. Verharen's repetitious use of such a phrase 
appeared clearly calculated to inflame the emotions of the jury. (Tr., p.783, L.24 -
p.784, L.1.) The district court apparently sustained the objection, directing Mr. Verharen 
to "move on." (Tr., p.784, L.2.) 
Mr. Verharen did not move on though. Two questions later, he turned to defense 
counsel, smiled, and asked Mr. Larsen the following question: "What did you do after 
that happed, after Mr. Ellington ran over your wife?" (Tr., p.784, Ls.11-12, p.787, Ls.8-
11 (emphasis added).) 
The next time the jury exited the courtroom, defense counsel made another 
motion for a mistrial, arguing that Mr. Verharen's actions, once again, were intentionally 
calculated to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jurors. (Tr., p.787, Ls.1-18.) In 
response, Mr. Verharen made no attempt to rebut defense counsel's representation that 
he had looked at defense counsel and smiled while using the phrase "ran over your 
wife" for a fifth time; nor did he contest defense counsel's contention that he had 
phrased his questions in a such a manner in a deliberate effort to appeal to the 
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emotions of the jury. (See Tr., p.?8?, Ls.20-21.) Instead, apparently recognizing that 
the district court would never hold him accountable for his actions, he simply offered his 
opinion that "I think you ought to deny the motion, Judge." (Tr., p.?8?, Ls.20-21.) 
Again, the district court seemed to recognize that Mr. Verharen's tactics were out 
of line (see Tr., p.?8?, L.22 - p.?88, L.11 (discussing the reality that the circumstances 
of the case are "quite chilling" but, of course, must be presented to the jury, but also 
commenting that those circumstances do "not need to be unduly belabored and I trust 
that counsel will move on from that point"»; however, it again declined (without 
explanation) to declare a mistrial. 52 (Tr., p.?88, Ls.12-13.) 
Mr. Ellington contends that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for 
a mistrial. He contends that Mr. Verharen's intentional, gratuitous references to 
Mr. Larsen's wife having been run over was calculated to, and did, appeal to the 
emotions of the jurors and, as such, constituted misconduct under cases such as 
Phillips, Peite, and Robertson. 
4. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Committing A Fraud Upon The 
Court In An Effort To Get Irrelevant, But Highly Emotional And Prejudicial, 
Testimony In Front Of The Jury 
Just as Mr. Verharen sought to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury 
by offering inflammatory testimony from Mr. Hartmann and gratuitous references to 
52 Although there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Ellington's right to a fair trial was consciously 
relegated to a "back seat" position when the district court ruled upon his repeated motions for a mistrial, 
one must wonder how much the district court's administrative concerns had a subconSCiOUS impact on its 
decision-making. Not only was this was a high-profile case which was going to be shown on Court TV 
(Supp. Tr., p.6, L.21 - p.7, L.1), but the district court had already shown a fair amount of concern for 
when this case could be tried (if not tried as scheduled during the end of August/beginning of September 
2006), given the district court's packed calendar (see Tr., p.56, L.10 - p.57, L.3, p.57, Ls.17-23; see also 
Tr., p.85, LS.23 - p.86, L.3 (indicating that, although the court's calendar was not dispositive, it was a 
consideration in evaluating Mr. Ellington's request for a continuance), and that was before a jury had 
been selected (over the course of an entire day) and three and one-half days' worth of evidence had been 
presented. 
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Mr. Larsen's wife having been run over, so too did he appeal to the jurors' emotions by 
offering the testimony of Dr. Ross, the pathologist/deputy medical examiner who 
performed Mrs. Larsen's autopsy. In addition, it appears that Mr. Verharen lied to the 
district court about the purpose of Dr. Ross' testimony in order to have that testimony 
heard by the jury. 
As is discussed in some detail below (see Part II(C)(3), infra), the defense moved 
to preclude Dr. Ross from testifying. (Tr., p.1241, Ls.6-22, p.1243.) The basis of the 
defense motion was that any further testimony as to Mrs. Larsen's injuries would be 
irrelevant to any issue that was actually in dispute and, even if such testimony was 
relevant, its probative value would be substantially outweighed by its cumulative nature 
and prejudicial effect. (See Tr., p.1241, Ls.6-22, p.1243.) 
The State argued in response that the testimony was relevant to show 
Mrs. Larsen's location on the roadway when she was hit (Tr., p.1242, Ls.2-11) and/or to 
rebut the anticipated testimony of the defense experts regarding the speed of 
Mr. Ellington's Blazer when it struck Mrs. Larsen (Tr., p.1242, L.18 - p.1243, L.2). 
Ultimately, the district court expressed skepticism that a pathologist could offer 
testimony related to the issue of where Mrs. Larsen was on the roadway when she was 
struck (Tr., p.1242, Ls.15-16),53 but it came up with its own rationale for why Dr. Ross' 
testimony might be relevant. It concluded that Dr. Ross' testimony could be relevant to 
the question of "whether [Mrs. Larsen] was moving into Mr. Ellington's vehicle or 
whether she was moving away or whether she wasn't moving at all." (Tr., p.1244, LS.2-
5.) Because "the direction of the impact may be something that the physician is in a 
53 The district court never addressed Mr. Verharen's contention that Dr. Ross' testimony was relevant to 
address issues expected to be raised by the defense experts. (See Tr., p.1243, L.3 - p. 1244, L.18.) 
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better position to testify to," the district court ruled that "[ajs long was we can focus on 
the issue at hand that you have addressed, Mr. Verharen,54 I think you can go ahead 
and proceed." (Tr., p.1244, Ls.6-18.) 
Ultimately, however, Dr. Ross' testimony was nothing more than a lengthy and 
graphic description of Mrs. Larsen's gruesome injuries-both to her torso and to her 
head (including the "pulpafaction" of her brain). (Tr., p.1250, L.22 - p.1256, L.19, 
p.1257, L.22 - p.1259, L.5.) Mr. Verharen never asked Dr. Ross any questions about 
where Mrs. Larsen was on the roadway (see generally Tr., p.1246, L.4 - p.1260, L.12) 
and, in fact, during cross-examination, Dr. Ross stated explicitly that he could not 
determine where Mrs. Larsen was on the roadway when she was hit. (Tr., p.1261, Ls.2-
6). Nor did Mr. Verharen ever ask Dr. Ross any questions about the "directional impact" 
of the Blazer. (See generallyTr., p.1246, L.4 - p.1260, L.12.) Dr. Ross did testify fairly 
extensively about the injuries tq,Mrs. Larsen's torso (Tr., p.1249, L.22 - p.1251, L.10),55 
and he further testified that these injuries were consistent with getting struck by (as 
opposed to being run over by) a motor vehicle (Tr., p.1255, L.11 - p.1256, L.5),56 but he 
was never asked for (and he never volunteered) an opinion as to where the impact fell 
on Mrs. Larsen's body. (See generally Tr., p.1246, L.4 - p.1260, L.12.) Finally, 
although Mr. Verharen did ask Dr. Ross whether he could ascertain the speed of the 
54 Mr. Verharen had not addressed this issue. As noted, it was the district court itself which came up with 
the reason why Dr. Ross' testimony might be relevant. However, by going forward with Dr. Ross' 
testimony in the face of this admonishment, Mr. Ellington contends that Mr. Verharen adopted the district 
court's reasoning and was bound to "focus on the issue at hand," i.e .. the question of which direction, if 
any, Mrs. Larsen was moving when she was struck. 
55 Dr. Ross testified more extensively, however, about the injuries to Mrs. Larsen's head. (See 
Tr., p.1252, L.ll - p.1255, L.6.) Obviously though, if Mr. Verharen were interested in following the district 
court's instruction that he focus narrowly on the directional impact question, there was no reason 
whatsoever to discuss (much less discuss in graphic detail) the injuries to Mrs. Larsen's head. 
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Blazer based on Mrs. Larsen's injuries, Dr. Ross testified that he could not do so. 
(Tr., p.1256, L.20 - p.1257, L.21.) Thus, Dr. Ross did not, and, in fact, could not, testify 
as to any of the matters which Mr. Verharen had used to justify bringing Dr. Ross to the 
witness stand. 
Accordingly, once outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved, yet 
again, for a mistrial, this time based upon the fact that Mr. Verharen had committed a 
fraud upon the district court, and that the purpose of such fraud was to bombard the 
jurors with more highly emotional, highly prejudicial evidence. (Tr., p.1262, Ls.7-23.) 
Apparently, recognizing that Mr. Verharen was out of warnings and 
admonishments, but still not willing to take the drastic step of granting a mistrial, the 
district court misstated the State's arguments and its own ruling in such a way as to 
make it seem that Mr. Verharen had done nothing improper. The district court stated as 
follows: 
I'm not satisfied that Mr. Verharen's offer was inconsistent with my 
ruling. In fact it was quite neatly concise as far as what the court's 
concern was. I don't think the doctor independently is expected to testify 
as to where Mrs. Larsen was in the roadway. There's a lot of evidence 
that the state has offered. My surmise is is [sic] that evidence, in 
combination with what the physician has explained to the court, may 
provide a picture in terms of the location of Ms. Larsen in the roadway. 
I think, for example, if her blunt force injuries are all on the chest 
area, than that would certainly be consistent with standing in the position 
that some of the witnesses have stated that she facing the front of the 
vehicle when she was struck. If those contusions and other blunt forces 
injuries were more on her back region, I suspect that would become 
inconsistent with some of the evidence that the state has offered. The 
state may not be able to establish that which they hoped to establish, but I 
don't think that the offer was outside the scope of my limitation, so the 
court would deny the motion for a mistrial. 
56 The doctor's testimony was wholly unremarkable as no one has ever questioned the witnesses' 
contention that Mrs. Larsen was struck in the torso by the front of the Blazer, and that when she dropped 
to the ground the wheels of the vehicle ran over her head. 
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(Tr., p.1262, L.25 - p.1263, L.19.) 
Notwithstanding· the district court's ruling, Mr. Ellington contends that 
Mr. Verharen lied to the district court, defense counsel, and Mr. Ellington when he 
claimed that Dr. Ross would be testifying about where Mrs. Larsen was in the roadway 
when she was struck and/or the speed of Mr. Ellington's Blazer, and that he breached 
an implied promise to focus narrowly on the question of whether Dr. Ross could opine 
as to the directional from which Mrs. Larsen as impacted by the Blazer. While this 
deception is certainly troubling in and of itself, see IDAHO R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 3.3(a)(1) 
(prohibiting the making of false statements to a tribunal), it also constitutes misconduct. 
See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571-72, 165 P.3d 273, 285-86 (2007) (finding 
misconduct where the prosecutor represented one thing to the district court, then did 
another). In addition, because the obvious purpose of Mr. Verharen's fraud was simply 
to remind the jury of the horrific details of Mrs. Larsen's injuries, i.e., influence the jurors 
with emotion, it also constituted misconduct under such cases as Phillips, Peite, and 
Robertson. 
D. The Four Instances Of Misconduct Cited Above Require That Mr. Ellington Be 
Granted A New Trial 
As noted above, any time prosecutorial misconduct is found (and it has been 
contemporaneously objected to), the next question is whether that misconduct warrants 
a new trial, or whether it was harmless. Field, 144 Idaho at 571, 165 P.3d at 285. In 
determining whether an error is harmless, the reviewing court must determine whether it 
appears, beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967); State v. Roy, 127 Idaho 228,231,899 
P.2d 441, 444 (1995). "To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is ... to find 
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that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in 
question, as revealed in the record." Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391,403 (1991); see also 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991). The issue is whether the jury actually 
rested its verdict on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the 
inadmissible evidence. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. at 404-405. "The inquiry, in other 
words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would 
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial 
was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). 
Part of the harmless error analysis in a prosecutorial misconduct case may 
involve an inquiry into the extent to which the evidence or argument complained of was 
utilized or exploited by the State. See State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296, 300, 62 P.3d 
644, 648 (Ct. App. 2003). The other part of the analysis, certainly, is the interplay 
between the evidence or argument complained of and the other evidence in the case. 
State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709,714,992 P.2d 158, 163 (1999). 
1. The State's Misconduct Was Part Of A Larger Pattern Of Attempting To 
Prejudice The Jurv 
Turning to the first consideration in the harmless error analysis, Mr. Ellington 
contends that the four instances of misconduct discussed above were not only 
intentional, but were also part of the State's overall strategy of trying to obtain a 
conviction by manipulating the jury with bias and prejudice. Below are some examples 
of conduct which, although not presented as individual claims of misconduct, 
demonstrate that the State's strategy from the outset of trial was to prevail through the 
use of prejudice. 
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Long before any testimony was ever heard, or any physical evidence admitted, 
Mr. Verharen began arguing that Mr. Ellington was guilty. Before the jury selection 
process even began, Mr. Verharen responded to the district court's request that he 
introduce himself and the case to the panel of prospective jurors by presenting the 
State's interpretation of the evidence, as if it was established fact: 
In this particular incident Mr. Ellington used his vehicle to ram the 
two daughters' car. And after he did that he ran over their mother who 
was on foot coming to the aid of her two daughters. During the incident 
the father of the daughters, Mr. Larsen, used a pistol that he had with him 
to try and stop the attack on his family. 
(Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.8-13.)57 The following day, after a jury had been selected, he offered 
an over-the-top opening statement in which he went well beyond a mere recitation of 
the anticipated evidence and the State's theory of how that evidence ought to be 
interpreted, and he again offered the State's interpretation of the evidence as if it was 
established fact: 
Mr. Ellington used his vehicle . . . to essentially commit three different 
violent acts upon three different women. He first used that vehicle upon 
two sisters. He rammed their vehicle with his .... 
He then turned the vehicle immediately upon the two daughters' 
mother who was running across the road to the aid of her daughters ... 
and he turned that vehicle upon their mother, struck her and killed her. 
The reason that he committed these acts is simply because he was 
angry .... 
He comes around and then he has a couple of choices. At this 
point Mr. Ellington can go straight down Scarcello Road . . " But the 
choice that he makes is to carry out the threats that he had earlier made 
upon these two women, he had punched their window, he had backed up 
to them and he had drove in their lane towards them. This time he doesn't 
back off and he doesn't drive away, this time he carries out his threat. 
57 There was no objection to Mr. Verharen's argument. 
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Vonette is screaming, she's hysterical of what she's seeing. Joel is 
in fear for his daughters' lives. He knows that he has to somehow try to 
stop Mr. Ellington. He gets the pistol out of the car. . .. He goes to the-
trying to make it to the driver's side of the Blazer to stop Mr. Ellington. 
Vonette goes kind of the other way, she goes across the road 
running to her daughters. She is going to try and get to her daughters .... 
[K]nowing that he has to somehow stop Mr. Ellington from either 
hurting his daughters again or running over his wife he does the one thing 
he can think of, and that is to shoot at the engine of the motor .... 
. .. Mr. Ellington is still looking forward toward his [Mr. Larsen's] wife .... 
He's got this thing punched, Mr. Ellington does, and again Mr. Ellington 
has a choice. He can just goes [sic] straight ahead at this point and get 
into the eastbound lane. . .. That would be the easiest thing for him to do 
... , but the choice he makes is similar to the choice he made when he 
rammed the two women's car. 
And instead what he does is he makes a hard left turn and he turns 
into the wrong lane, which is the westbound lane, and so makes this hard 
left turn into the wrong lane and that's where Mrs. Larsen is as she's trying 
to get to her daughters. As Mrs. Larsen [is] almost to where her daughters 
are, she apparently realizes that she's not going to make it and she stops 
and tries to back pedal. And it's at that moment that Mr. Ellington strikes 
her. 
Based on the investigation in this case, as well as the statements 
that you're going to hear up on the witness stand, you're going to find 
Mr. Ellington did commit these crimes, that he did intentionally batter these 
women with that vehicle, and he did intentionally kill their mother. 
(Tr., p.118, L.17 - p.133, L.7.)58 Quite clearly, Mr. Verharen's intention at this point was 
to try to predispose the jury to find Mr. Ellington guilty. 
As is discussed in additional detail below (see Part J1(C)(1), infra), early in the 
presentation of the State's case-in-chief, Mr. Verharen referenced the "location of this 
crime" (Tr., p.250, Ls.24-25 (emphasis added» while questioning Detective Maskell, 
58 Again, there was no objection to Mr. Verharen's argument. 
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despite the fact that there had been a pretrial ruling from the district court making it clear 
that the State could refer to the "death scene," but could not call it "a murder scene" or 
refer to the scene "in any other conclusory fashion." (Tr., p.83, Ls.4_6.)59 Minutes later, 
Mr. Verharen did it again; he referenced the "crime scene" in yet another question to 
Detective Maskel1.6o (Tr., p.255, Ls.15-17.) 
Throughout the early stages of the case, Mr. Verharen fought to have a large 
number of extremely graphic and disturbing photographs of Mrs. Larsen's injuries 
admitted into evidence and shown to the jury. (See Tr., p. 160, L.21, p.168 - p.177, 
L.4.) Ultimately, most of those photos were ruled inadmissible by the district court on 
the basis that their prejudicial effect far outweighed their probative value. 61 (Tr., p.172, 
L.20 - p.177, L.16.) This did not stop Mr. Verharen though, as he continued to argue 
for admission of the disturbing photos throughout the trial. (See, e g., Tr., p.254, L.15-
p.259, L.9 (attempting once more (without success) to have Exhibit 35 admitted); p.261, 
L.14 - p.264, L.6 (attempting once more (also without success) to have Exhibit 29 
admitted); p.549, L.6 - p.550, L.12 (again arguing that the gruesome photos should be 
admitted).) Indeed, at one point, the district court remarked on Mr. Verharen's 
"considerable efforts to admit photographs that [it] thought were relatively gruesome," 
expressing its lack of understanding of how those photos could be relevant to any of the 
facts at issue in the case, and, ultimately, admonishing Mr. Verharen to "focus not on 
59 Defense objected, and the objection was sustained by the district court. (Tr., p.251, Ls.2-7.) 
60 This time, defense counsel did not object. 
61 Obviously, since most of the photos offered by the State were not admitted, most of them are not in the 
record on appeal; however, for some reason Exhibits 36 and 37 are in the record. Thus, this Court can 
see just how prejudicial those photos would have been had they been viewed by the jury. Undersigned 
counsel would forewarn this Court, however, that these photos are extremely difficult to view. 
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issues that would bear upon the prejudice of the jury but upon the facts of this particular 
case." (Tr., p.547, L.12 - p.548, L.24.) 
Mr. Verharen did not just seek to admit gruesome photographs of Mrs. Larsen in 
death; he also sought to introduce two photographs of Mrs. Larsen in life. First, 
Mr. Verharen successfully sought admission of a large (approximately 11" x 14"), full-
color portrait of the entire Larsen family.62 (Tr., p.345, L.11 - p.346, L.7; see also Ex. 1 
(the photo in question).) Later, Mr. Verharen sought the admission of a photocopy of 
Mrs. Larsen's driver's Iicense.63 (Tr., p.721, Ls.12-18, p.722, L.5; see also Ex. 119 (the 
photocopy in question).) Ultimately, however, the district court sustained a defense 
objection to admission of the photograph (see Tr., p.722, Ls.6-8, p.729, Ls.21-22), 
finding it to be irrelevant. (Tr., p.735, LS.19, 22-24.) 
When it came to emotional appeals, Mr. Verharen did not limit himself to the 
emotions attendant to Mrs. Larsen's death; he also tried to engender sympathy for 
Jovon's physical injuries. Late in the State's case-in-chief, Mr. Verharen questioned 
Jovon about the bruises, as well as the relatively severe back injury (necessitating 
surgery), that she allegedly sustained when Mr. Ellington's Blazer collided with her 
62 The defense did not object to the admission of this photograph and, thus, it was admitted. However, 
later, the district court questioned the relevance of this photograph before admonishing Mr. Verharen to 
focus on the facts, not prejudicial emotional appeals. (Tr., p.547, L.19 - p.548, L.24.) 
63 Mr. Verharen's argument in support of admission of the photo of Mrs. Larsen's driver's license was the 
specious contention that "[iJt corroborates the testimony, some of which we have heard in this case, more 
of which I expect later, that she was the operator of that vehicle [the SubaruJ." (Tr., p.735, Ls.16-18.) 
The district court determined that Mr. Verharen's argument was unpersuasive, observing that the 
presence of a driver's license does nothing to establish who was actually behind the wheel. (Tr., p.735, 
Ls.19-24.) Interestingly, when the district court then wondered alloud whether the reason the State 
sought admission of the exhibit was to prove Mrs. Larsen's height and weight (Tr., p.725, L.24 - p.736, 
L.1), Mr. Verharen stated, "[tJhat is a good idea, Judge, I'll offer it for that too." (Tr., p.736, Ls.2-3.) Thus, 
it appears that Mr. Verharen did not have a reasonable, good faith basis for admission of the photo of the 
driver's license when he offered it, and that the real purpose for its admission would have been to appeal 
to the emotions of the jurors. 
51 
Honda.64 (Tr., p.1189, L.21 - p.1190, L.3, p.1190, L.19 - p.1191, L.12, p.1214, L.25-
p.1215, L.22.) 
Finally, as is discussed in additional detail below (see Part II(C)(2), infra), on at 
least three occasions, Mr. Verharen elicited opinion testimony from Trooper Daly to the 
effect that the collisions at issue in this case were intentional, not accidental (see, e.g., 
Tr., p.889, Ls.14-18 ("The driver of the Blazer is maneuvering that Blazer through 
steering and acceleration and intentionally pushing it.")65; p.932, LS.14-16 ("I'd like to 
define this as an incident, not an accident. An accident is when you're walking through 
the forest with your wife and a tree hits her .... ,,)66; p.972, L.15 ("There isn't an 
accident.,,)67), even though this was the ultimate issue for the jury in this case and he 
knew, or should have known, that Trooper Daly had no basis whatsoever to opine as to 
Mr. Ellington's state of mind (see Part II(C)(2), infra). 
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Ellington submits that the specific instances of 
misconduct described above were just four small parts of a much larger pattern of the 
State attempting to try this case based on extraneous conSiderations. 
2. Given The Closeness Of The Evidence In This Case, It Cannot Be Said 
That The State's Systematic Attempts To Prejudice The JUry, Including 
The Misconduct Described Above, Could Not Have Contributed To The 
JUry'S Verdict 
As should be obvious from the foregoing statement of facts, this is not a case 
where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt. Quite to the contrary, the jury could 
have very easily acquitted Mr. Ellington-either on the theory that he simply did not 
64 The defense did not object to any of the questions or answers concerning Jovon's injuries. 
65 A defense objection to this testimony was sustained by the district court. (Tr., p.889, LS.17 -18.) 
66 Defense counsel did not object to this testimony. 
67 The defense objection to this testimony is ultimately what led to the district court's ruling which is the 
subject of the issue argued in Part 1I(C)(2), below. 
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have time to perceive and react, or on the theory that his actions were justified given the 
mortal danger he faced. After all, he was chased twice; his Blazer was hit by Mr. and 
Mrs. Larsen's Subaru; and he had a man firing a .44 Magnum at his vehicle at close 
range. And, at the end of it all on Scarcello Road, things happened so very quickly.68 
In a case where there is ample evidence of the defendant's innocence, and 
where one of the State's key witnesses has monumental credibility problems (see notes 
24, 25, 28, 29, 36, 37, and 38, supra) it is beyond mere possibility that the State's 
systematic attempts to interject extraneous factors into the jury's decision-making-
including a comment on Mr. Ellington's silence and a raft of emotionally-charged (but 
irrelevant) information-it is downright likely. Accordingly, Mr. Ellington submits that the 
misconduct complained of is not harmless, and that, under both the United States and 
Idaho Constitutions, Mr. Ellington is entitled to a new trial. 
II. 
The District Court Erred By Admitting Certain Highly Prejudicial Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ellington contends that the district court erred in three respects in admitting 
evidence. First, even though it had recognized that conclusory statements about the 
supposed "murder scene" would be improper for the State to present, the district court 
allowed the State to have admitted an exhibit (Exhibit 46) bearing the term "homicide" 
68 As difficult as it is to listen to, Mr. Ellington would urge this Court to carefully consider the last four 
minutes of the recording of the second 9-1-1 call. (As noted above, that portion of the call can be found 
at Exhibit 151, track 3, or Exhibit 152, track 1. For the ease of this Court's reference, a duplicate copy of 
Exhibit 151 is attached hereto as Attachment C.) Only then can this Court gain an appreciation for just 
how quickly everything happened, and only then can this Court understand just how close this case truly 
is. 
53 
next to Mrs. Larsen's name. Mr. Ellington asserts that this was error because the term 
"homicide," as used on Exhibit 46, had no probative value whatsoever and was highly 
prejudicial. Second, the district court allowed one of the State's accident 
reconstructionists to testify as to his belief that Mr. Ellington intentionally hit both the 
girls' Honda and Mrs. Larsen with his Blazer. Mr. Ellington submits that this was error 
because such an opinion was not the product of any particular expertise, but simply an 
inference which invaded the province of the jUry. Third, the district court allowed the 
deputy medical examiner to testify regarding the autopsy he conducted on Mrs. Larsen. 
Mr. Ellington contends that this was error because the pathologist's graphic discussion 
of Mrs. Larsen's injuries had little, if any, probative value, and was highly prejudicial. 
Finally, Mr. Ellington asserts that because all of the erroneously-admitted 
evidence is highly prejudicial, and because this was such a close case, the 
erroneously-admitted evidence likely contributed to the jury's verdict. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Mr. Ellington contends that the district court erred in admitting certain evidence at 
trial because even if that evidence was relevant under Idaho Rule of Evidence 401, its 
prejudicial effect was substantially outweighed by certain countervailing interests under 
Rule 403, and/or it was an opinion which exceeded the proper bounds of Rule 702. 
Turning first to the question of the applicable standards of review under Rules 
401 and 403, those standards were succinctly stated as follows: 
Separate standards of review apply to issues of admissibility of 
evidence under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. We freely review 
questions of relevancy under I.R.E. 401 because relevancy is a question 
of law. On the question of whether the evidence's probative value is 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudiCial impact, however, we will 
overturn the trial court's decision only for abuse of discretion. Where a 
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matter is committed to the discretion of the trial court, we conduct a three-
tiered inquiry on appeal. We consider whether: (1) the lower court rightly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
State v. Waddle, 125 Idaho 526, 528, 873 P.2d 171, 173 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations 
omitted). 
With regard to Rule 702, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the admission of 
expert opinion testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Merwin, 131 
Idaho 642,646,962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998). 
C. The District Court Erred By Admitting Certain Highly Prejudicial Evidence 
1. The District Court Erred In Failing To Strike The Word "Homicide" From 
The State's Exhibit 46 
At the pretrial conference of August 10, 2006, defense counsel made an oral 
motion in limine seeking to preclude the State's witnesses from using the phrase "death 
scene" in describing the location on Scarcello Road where the key events in this case 
occurred, arguing that such a designation would be unduly prejudicial. (Tr., p.74, LS.9-
16, p.80, Ls.11-15.) The district court ultimately denied that motion, finding that "death 
scene" was an appropriate designation and would not be unduly prejudicial if not used 
gratUitously, but ruled that other conclusory terms, such as "murder scene" would not be 
allowed. (Tr., p.82, L.17 - p.83, L.10, p.89, Ls.24-25.) 
Notably, very early in Mr. Ellington's trial, the State twice violated the district 
court's pretrial ruling. The first violation occurred when the prosecutor asked Brad 
Maskell, the lead detective, whether he had gone "on down to the actual location of this 






sustained a defense objection to the prosecutor's question, whereupon the prosecutor 
rephrased his question using the term "death scene." (Tr., p.251, Ls.2-7.) The second 
violation occurred just minutes later when the prosecutor again referenced the "crime 
scene" in questioning Detective Maskell. (Tr., p.255, Ls.15-17.) This time, defense 
counsel failed to object. 
Later, the State sought and, without any defense objection, was granted, 
admission of Exhibit 46. (Tr., p.613, L.1 - p.614, L.8.) Exhibit 46 is a diagram, 
prepared by the State, of the crash scene. (See generally Ex. 46.) At the top of the 
exhibit is the following caption: 
(Ex. 46.) 
Vonette Larsen Homicide 
Jonathon W. Ellington - Suspect 
Scarcello Road - 1 Mile East of Highway 41 
Kootenai County, Idaho 
Idaho State Police Case No. C06-0005 
Kootenai County Sheriff Department Case No. 06-00027 
On the next morning of trial, defense counsel moved the district court to have the 
word "homicide" "stricken, just marked out" from the caption on the top of Exhibit 46. 
(Tr., p.628, Ls.3-24.) Defense counsel argued that "homicide" would be synonymous 
with "murder" in the jurors' minds and, thus, defense counsel implicitly incorporated the 
defense argument regarding the prejudicial nature of such a descriptor. (See Tr., p.628, 
Ls.20-24.) 
In response, the prosecutor argued that the word "homicide" should not be 
stricken because the exhibit had already been admitted, there would be no prejudice, 
and "[i] certainly doesn't say murder. Says [sic] homicide." (Tr., p.628, Ls.15-18.) 
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Ultimately, the district court denied the defense motion and allowed the word 
"homicide" to stay. (Tr., p.628, L.25 - p.629, L.17.) The district court reasoned that the 
term "homicide" is accurate and non-prejudicial because it refers to the killing of another 
human being generally, and because nobody disputes that Mr. Ellington killed 
Mrs. Larsen. (Tr., p.628, L.25 - p.629, L.17.) 
Mr. Ellington submits that, although the district court got the technical definition of 
"homicide" right, its denial of his motion to strike the word "homicide" was analytically 
flawed. First, the district court failed to analyze what, if any, probative value the 
"homicide" label had. See I.R.E. 403. 
Second, the district court's analysis of the degree to which use of the term 
"homicide" risked prejudicing Mr. Ellington was illogical. The district court seems to 
have reasoned that since the term "homicide" is technically accurate, it cannot be 
prejudicial. (See Tr., p.628, L.25 - p.629, L.17.) However, Rule 403 clearly 
contemplates that the technical accuracy or truth of a statement is not the metric by 
which prejudice is measured. See I.R.E. 403. 
Had the district court conducted an appropriate "prejudice" analysis, it would 
have concluded that the State's use of the term "homicide" in Exhibit 46 was, in fact, 
prejudicial. That is because, although the technical legal definition of homicide is "any 
killing of a human being by any other human being," that term is "most commonly used 
to refer to an unlawful homicide such as murder or manslaughter." BARRON'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 221 (3d ed. 1991); see also Merriam-Webster's Online Thesaurus (available 
at <http://www.merriam-webster.com/>) (listing as synonyms the following terms: "foul 
play," "murder," and "slaying"). Thus, the lay jurors likely took the term "homicide" to 
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mean "murder" or "manslaughter," especially where the following line stated: "Jonathon 
W. Ellington - Suspect." Moreover, the district court itself had acknowledged earlier in 
the case that the prosecution's use of terminology which assumes that a crime has 
been committed, such as "murder scene" or "location of this crime," is inherently 
prejudicial to the defendant. (See Tr., p.82, L.17 - p.83, L.10 (admonishing the 
prosecution not to say "murder scene" or use any other such conclusory language), 
p.250, L.24 - p.251, L.1 (sustaining a defense objection use of the phrase "location of 
this crime").) 
Given the foregoing, Mr. Ellington contends that the district court abused its 
discretion in failing to strike the "homicide" reference in Exhibit 46. 
2. The District Court Erred In Allowing Trooper Daly To Testifv That, In His 
Opinion, Mr. Ellington Acted Intentionally In Striking The Girls' Honda And 
Mrs. Larsen 
At Mr. Ellington's trial, Idaho State Police Detective Sean Daly testified fairly 
extensively for the State regarding his reconstruction of the incident on Scarcello Road. 
At one point in his direct examination testimony, Trooper Daly responded to a question 
about how certain debris ended up where it did by stating as follows: "The driver of the 
Blazer is maneuvering that Blazer through steering and acceleration and intentionally 
pushing it." (Tr., p.889, LS.11-16 (emphasis added).) At that point, defense counsel 
objected and the objection was sustained. (Tr., p.889, Ls.17-18.) 
Later, when asked on cross-examination whether he was "able to determine any 
speeds from this accident," Trooper Daly prefaced his answer with the following 
comment: "I'd like to define this as an incident, not an accident. An accident is when 
you're walking through the forest with your wife and a tree hits her, or your husband." 
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(Tr., p.932, Ls.12-16.) This time, defense counsel failed to object-either to the 
unresponsiveness of this portion of his answer, or to the impropriety of his implication 
that Mr. Ellington had intended to hit Mrs. Larsen. (See Tr., p.932, Ls.12-20.) 
Finally, during re-direct examination, when asked why he did not attempt to 
calculate any speeds for Mr. Ellington's Blazer as part of his reconstruction, Trooper 
Daly testified that "[tJhere isn't an accident," while overemphasizing the word "accident." 
(Tr., p.972, Ls.10-15, p.973, Ls.11-12.) At that point, defense counsel objected and 
asked to be heard outside the presence of the jury. (Tr., p.972, Ls.16-17.) Once the 
jury had been excused, defense counsel argued that Trooper Daly was intentionally 
invading the province of the jury in a transparent attempt to influence its verdict,69 
(Tr., p.973, Ls.2-18, p.974, Ls.5-7, p.982, Ls.17-20.) 
The district court recognized that Trooper Daly's testimony was "that this was an 
incident that he has, in his opinion, has attributed to blame Mr. Ellington of something 
apparently could have been avoided" (Tr., p.973, Ls.19-25), but the district court could 
not see anything wrong with that because Trooper Daly was qualified as an expert 
(Tr., p.974, Ls.1-4, p.974, L22 - p.975, L3). 
At that point, the district court, and then the prosecutor, proceeded to question 
Trooper Daly (still outside the presence of the jury) in an effort to determine how 
Trooper Daly arrived at his conclusion that Mr. Ellington acted intentionally, and what 
this opinion has to with speed calculations. (See Tr., p.975, L6 - p.988, L14.) During 
that time, Trooper Daly tried to explain his "logic," which apparently boils down to the 
69 Defense counsel also moved for a mistrial based on the State's pattern of attempting to improperly 
influence the jury. (Tr., p.973, LS.6, 16-18.) The State's pattern of trying to influence the jury was 
discussed in greater detail in Part 1(0)(1), above. 
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following: (a) the tire marks left in the roadway are not indicative of the Mr. Ellington's 
Blazer having been "out of control"; (b) if Mr. Ellington's Blazer was not "out of control," 
he must have intended to hit the Honda and Mrs. Larsen; and (c) since Mr. Ellington's 
actions were intentional, the question of reaction time is irrelevant. (See Tr., p.975, L.6 
- p.988, L.14.) 
Ultimately, the district court ruled that that was appropriate testimony and, 
besides overruling the defense objection and denying its motion for a mistrial, invited 
the prosecutor to ask Trooper Daly additional questions on this topic. (Tr., p.988, LS.15-
24.) 
Mr. Ellington contends that the district court erred. Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 
provides that a qualified expert may offer testimony, including his opinion, on scientific, 
technical, or other specialized matters within his expertise, if that testimony will assist 
the jury in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. I.R.E. 702. Expert 
opinion testimony does not "assist" the jury, however, where it merely usurps the jury's 
function by drawing inferences which the jurors are just as capable of drawing 
themselves. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688,695-96,760 P.2d 27, 34-35 (1988). Thus, 
in State v. Hester, a lewd conduct case, the Court of Appeals held that it was error to 
allow the State's experts to opine of as to the identity of the minor's abuser. Id. 
The present case is really no different from Hester. Here, the State's expert 
testified about an inference he drew as to one of the ultimate issues in the case-
Mr. Ellington's state of mind. However, that inference was not based on any 
particularized knowledge; it was simply a matter of his personal belief in Mr. Ellington's 
guilt (which is not altogether surprising, given his employer, the Idaho State Police). 
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In addition, implicit in Rule 702 is the prerequisite that the witness' opinion flow 
logically from application of a valid, reliable methodology to the facts of the case. Cf. 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).70 Indeed, "[e]xpert 
opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of 
no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and, therefore, is inadmissible as 
evidence." Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 838, 153 P.3d 
1180, 1184 (2007). 
In this case, Trooper Daly's personal opinion as to Mr. Ellington's intent is neither 
logical, nor the product of any sort of reliable specialized methodology which Trooper 
Daly was qualified to employ. While it is certainly possible to infer that Mr. Ellington 
intended to strike the Honda or Mrs. Larsen based upon the lack of tire mark evidence 
indicating a loss of control, that is not the only inference that can be drawn; nor is it the 
best inference to be drawn. Indeed, other highly plausible inferences that could be 
drawn are that: (a) Mr. Ellington simply did not have time to react to the Honda and/or 
Mrs. Larsen given the full acceleration of his Blazer, the short timeframes involved, and 
the myriad distractions caused by numerous things happening at the same time71 ; (b) 
Mr. Ellington overcorrected when he tried to regain the roadway after having been hit by 
the Larsens' Subaru; (c) Mr. Ellington was looking back at the car that had just rammed 
him, instead of looking out for the Honda; (d) Mr. Ellington was trying to drive off of the 
front of the Honda (which, had it worked, would have been faster than shifting into 
70 Although Daubert has been held not to apply to Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, see Carnell v. Barker 
Management, Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 48 P.3d 651 (2002), the principles of Daubert have nevertheless been 
expressly adopted by the Idaho courts. See, e.g., State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647 
~Ct. App. 1996). 
1 While Trooper Daly would have everyone believe that the lack of evidence of loss of control negates 
the need to consider reaction time, his reasoning is ridiculously circular. (See note 27, supra.) 
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reverse, backing up, then shifting back into drive), but couldn't because his Blazer was 
hung up on the Honda; (e) Mr. Ellington was looking at the man who was shooting at 
him when he hit Mrs. Larsen; (f) Mr. Ellington was ducking when he hit Mrs. Larsen; (g) 
Mr. Ellington was flinching away from the gunfire when he veered left and hit 
Mrs. Larsen; (h) Mr. Ellington was trying not to hit Mr. Larsen, who was on his right, 
when he veered left and struck Mrs. Larsen; or (i) Mrs. Larsen jumped in front of 
Mr. Ellington's Blazer in another misguided attempt to block him in. The reality is that 
there is absolutely nothing about a lack of evidence of loss of control which makes 
Trooper Daly's opinion any more plausible than any of the alternative possibilities. In 
short, Trooper Daly's opinion was not a valid expert opinion and it should never have 
been admitted under Rule 702. 
3. The District Court Erred In Allowing Dr. Marco Ross To Testify 
A few days into Mr. Ellington's trial, the defense moved in limine to preclude 
Dr. Marco Ross, the pathologist and deputy medical examiner who conducted 
Mrs. Larsen's autopsy, from testifying. (Tr., p.1241, Ls.6-9, 19-21.) That motion was 
based upon the fact that Dr. Ross' testimony was irrelevant to any disputed issues of 
fact (because it was never disputed that injuries suffered as a result of being hit by the 
Blazer caused her death, and because numerous other witnesses had already testified 
to Ms. Larsen's injuries), and that his testimony about the graphic details of 
Mrs. Larsen's injury, along with any photos the State might seek to introduce, would 
serve no purpose other than to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury. 
(Tr., p.1241, Ls.9-18.) Clearly, this was an argument that, to the extent that Dr. Ross' 
testimony was relevant under Idaho Rule of Evidence 401, its probative value was 
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substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence within the meaning of Rule 403. 
In response, the prosecutor represented that, if allowed to testify, Dr. Ross would 
be distinguishing between those injuries which Mrs. Larsen sustained when she was hit 
by the Blazer and those which she sustained when she was run over by the Blazer, and 
the prosecutor argued that that testimony would be relevant to where she was 
positioned in the roadway when she was struck by Mr. Ellington's Blazer. (Tr., p.1242, 
Ls.2-11.) At that point, the district court concurred with defense counsel's observation 
that Mrs. Larsen's death had already been well-established, and expressed some 
skepticism as to how Dr. Ross' testimony could "relate to where she was positioned in 
the roadway." (Tr., p.1242, Ls.12-17.) The State then shifted gears completely, arguing 
that Dr. Ross' anticipated testimony about Mrs. Larsen's injuries (again, distinguishing 
between those sustained in the impact and those sustained in being run over) was 
necessary to rebut the anticipated testimony of the defense experts because those 
experts were expected to testify about the speed of the Blazer. (Tr., p.1242, L.18 -
p.1243, L.1.) 
In reply, defense counsel pointed out that Dr. Ross was a pathologist, not an 
accident reconstructionist, and, as such, he was unqualified to offer any opinion as to 
where Mrs. Larsen was on the roadway when she was struck. (Tr., p.1243, Ls.12-20.) 
In addition, counsel reiterated his argument that Dr. Ross' testimony would serve no 
purpose other than to inflame the passions and the prejudices of the jurors. 
(Tr., p.1243, Ls.21-22.) 
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In ruling on the defense's motion, the district court again obseNed that additional 
evidence of Mrs. Larsen's death, and the cause of her death, was unnecessary, as 
those facts had already been well-established. (Tr., p.1243, L.23 - p.1244, L.2.) 
However, it did note that there was some question as to where Mrs. Larsen was in the 
roadway when she was struck, and whether, and in which direction, she might have 
been moving at the time. (Tr., p.1244, Ls.2-5.) Thus, the district court ruled that 
Dr. Ross' testimony "may possibly be needed to show exactly the directional impact of 
those injuries" and, thus, Dr. Ross could testify about directional impacts. (Tr., p.1244, 
Ls.6-14.) Ultimately, the district court stated as follows: "I won't exclude the evidence, 
but I think much of it may be very well be [sic] cumulative and unnecessary. As long as 
we can focus on the issue at hand that your have addressed, Mr. Verharen,72 I think you 
can go ahead and proceed." (Tr., p.1244, Ls.15-18.) 
Mr. Ellington contends that it was error to allow Dr. Ross to testify at all. Even 
assuming that Dr. Ross' anticipated testimony was relevant to the directional impact of 
the Blazer, the district court abused its discretion in its balancing of the probative value 
of that testimony against the substantial and cumulative prejudice of having Dr. Ross 
describe for the jury (yet again) just how gruesome Mrs. Larsen's injuries were. See 
I.R.E. 403. 
First, turning to the probative value of Dr. Ross' testimony, it ought to be noted 
that there was never any dispute as to the fact that Mrs. Larsen was upright when she 
72 Although the district court admonished Mr. Verharen to focus on the issue that Mr. Verharen had 
addressed, it appears to have meant to admonish him to focus on the issue that the district court had 
addressed, i.e., the directional impact. (See Tr., p.1244, Ls.2-1B.) This was a justification for admission 
of the testimony which had never even been mentioned by the State. (See Tr., p.1241, L6 - p.1244, 
L23.) 
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was struck by the Blazer. Moreover, although there were some questions asked of the 
surviving Larsen family members about which direction Mrs. Larsen was moving, and 
what her feet were doing, at the time she was struck (see, e.g., Tr., p.389, L.9 - p.390, 
L.17), the State never advanced any argument as to why any of that information might 
be relevant (other than to support Mr. Larsen's wholly speculative testimony that 
Mrs. Larsen was trying to avoid Mr. Ellington's Blazer). (See note 33, supra.) Thus, the 
probative value of Dr. Ross' testimony in determining any fact of consequence to this 
case was minimal at best. 
Second, turning to the cumulative nature of the testimony, it cannot be disputed 
that the jury had already heard all of the relevant details of Mrs. Larsen's horrific injuries 
numerous times. Sgt. Lisa Carrington had already described the position of 
Mrs. Larsen's body, the lengthy river of blood which had flowed from the "gaping" hole 
in Mrs. Larsen's head, and the clump of hair found in the roadway (Tr., p.192, L.6 -
p.195, L.23); Det. Brad Maskell had already testified about the flow of blood from 
Mrs. Larsen's body, "the smear pattern on the road," and the fact that a clump of hair 
was located in the smear pattern (Tr., p.258, Ls.5-14, p.260, Ls.3-12); Joleen Larsen 
had already testified about watching her mother get hit by the Blazer, fall to the ground, 
and get run over (Tr., p.389, L.20 - p.392, L.9), and about how, immediately afterward, 
her mother was not moving or breathing (Tr., p.394, Ls.8-15); Anthony Hutchinson had 
already described Mrs. Larsen's "substantial" blood loss, the fact that another EMT 
determined that she had no heartbeat and was not breathing, and that he determined 
that she had no electrical activity in her heart and, thus, was "definitely" deceased 
(Tr., p.585, L.10 - p.586, L.2); Joel Larsen had already testified about watching his wife 
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get struck by the Blazer, fall to the ground, and have the Blazer's wheels go over her 
shoulders and head with "daylight underneath ... [tjhe best way to describe it is like 
putting a log across the road and driving over it" (p.781, L.7 - p.783, L.8); Mr. Larsen 
had also already testified about how he "knew she was dead because her eyes were, 
her head, her eyes were wide open and her head was smashed. She had some blood 
coming out. When I came back there was blood, six inch path half ways across the 
road" (Tr., p.784, L.23 - p.785, L.3), and about how the sight of Mrs. Larsen's condition 
caused Jovon to vomit (Tr., p.785, Ls.6-11); Deputy Gregg had already testified how he 
had tried, unsuccessfully, to find Mrs. Larsen's pulse, and about how he rolled 
Mrs. Larsen over in order to perform CPR, but, due to the severity of her injuries, could 
not find an airway (Tr., p.1021, Ls.5-10, p.1025, L.5 - p.1026, L.1); Deputy Klinkefus 
had already described his observations that Mrs. Larsen was unconscious and 
unresponsive, her eyes were open but staring blankly, and she had an open skull 
fracture (Tr., p.1149, L.20 - p.1151, L. 7); and Jovon had already testified that, although 
she did not see her mother get struck by the Blazer, she did see her rolling underneath 
it (Tr., p.1211, Ls.15-20). In addition, the jury had already heard the 9-1-1 recording of 
the girls' bone-chilling screams and Joleen hysterically repeating that "he just ran over 
my mom" and "he just killed my mom" (Ex. 151, track 3 at 02:04 - 04:02), as well as the 
recording of Deputy Klinkefus and another deputy talking in fairly graphic terms about 
Mrs. Larsen's injuries and prognosis as they attempted to render aid (see Ex. 148 at 
284 - 34073). Thus, there was nothing that Dr. Ross could have added that had not 
already been belabored by the prosecution. 
73 Among other things, the deputies noted that "[s]he's got a compressed skull fracture. I can see gray 
matter" (Ex. 148 at 334) and there was no need to send a helicopter because "I don't have any life-signs 
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Finally, turning to the prejudicial impact of the details of Mrs. Larsen's injuries, 
the testimony and, especially the recordings, obviously speak for themselves in terms of 
their emotional impact, but Mr. Ellington contends that they are very disquieting to say 
the least. Therefore, Dr. Ross' detailed discussion of Mrs. Larsen's injuries, including 
the "pulpafaction" of her brain, could do nothing other than to further heighten the jury's 
emotional response to this case. 
Given the foregoing, Mr. Ellington contends that the probative value of Dr. Ross' 
testimony was substantially outweighed by its cumulative nature and its prejudicial 
effect and, therefore, never should have been admitted under I.R.E. 403. 
D. Given The Closeness Of The Evidence In This Case, It Cannot Be Said That The 
Erroneously Admitted Evidence Could Not Have Contributed To The JUry'S 
Verdict 
As noted above, this is not a case where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt. 
Quite to the contrary, the jury could have vel}' easily acquitted Mr. Ellington-either on 
the theory that he simply did not have time to perceive and react, or on the theory that 
his actions were justified given the mortal danger he faced. After all, he was chased 
twice; his Blazer was hit by Mr. and Mrs. Larsen's Subaru; and he had a man firing a .44 
Magnum at his vehicle at close range. And, at the end of it all on Scarcello Road, things 
happened so very quickly. 
In a case where there is ample evidence of the defendant's innocence, and 
where one of the State's key witnesses has monumental credibility problems (see notes 
of life whatsoever-I have an open skull fracture" (Ex. 148 at 340). In addition, Deputy Klinkefus asked 
that dispatch "[a]dvise medical we have a severe, severe head trauma" (Ex. 148 at 336 (emphasis by 
Deputy Klinkefus)). Ultimately, the deputies made it clear that they believed that Mrs. Larsen had no 
chance of survival, stating "there's no way," and "yeah, she's gone, there's no signs of life." (Ex. 148 at 
297 - 307.) 
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24, 25, 28, 29, 36, 37, and 38, supra) it is beyond mere possibility that the erroneously 
admitted evidence, which includes an "expert" opinion as to the ultimate issue in the 
case, contributed to the jury verdict-it is downright likely. Accordingly, Mr. Ellington 
submits that the district court's errors in admitting the above-described evidence were 
not harmless, and Mr. Ellington is entitled to a new trial. 
III. 
Mr. Ellington Is Entitled To A New Trial Because The Entire Panel Of Prospective Jurors 
In His Case Was Tainted By Three Prospective Jurors Who Expressed Their Opinions 
That He Was Guiltv 
A. Introduction 
Not only are criminal defendants in Idaho entitled to a trial before a jury, but they 
are entitled to a trial before an unbiased jury. This right is guaranteed by the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution,74 which are made applicable to the 
states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Article I, Sections 
7 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution,75 Idaho Code §§ 19-1902, -2019, and _2020,76 and 
Idaho Criminal Rule 24(b).77 
Mr. Ellington contends that his right to an unbiased jury was violated when three 
prospective jurors tainted the entire panel of prospective jurors by expressing their pre-
conceived views-based on media coverage and, in one case, direct contact with a 
74 The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law .... " The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
~ury ... " 
5 Section 7 provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate .... " Section 
13 provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life liberty or property without due 
wocess of law." 
6 Section 19-1902 provides a statutory right to a jury trial in criminal cases, and sections 19-2019 and 
-2020 provided that jurors should be stricken for cause if they are determined to bring with them actual or 
implied bias. 
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member of the Larsen family-that Mr. Ellington was guilty of the charged offenses. In 
addition, he contends that this taint was prejudicial in light of other questions 
surrounding the neutrality of the jurors who actually deliberated, and in light of the 
closeness of this case generally. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In the present case, following the statements of concern by three potential jurors, 
defense counsel moved for a mistrial. (R. Vol. II, p.248; Supp. Tr., p.57, L.3 - p.58, 
L.22, p.59, Ls.11-18.) In cases in which there is such a contemporaneous objection and 
motion for a mistrial, the applicable standard of review is labeled an "abuse of 
discretion" standard, but, in effect, is a de novo standard: 
When there is a motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial error 
supported by a contemporaneous objection to the underlying procedural 
or evidentiary error we review the denial of a motion for mistrial for 
reversible error. 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge 
reasonably exercised his discretion in light of circumstances 
existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the 
question must be whether the event which precipitated the 
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed 
in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for 
mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of 
discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is 
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to 
declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, 
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error. 
State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912, 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003) 
(quoting State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102,1105 
(Ct. App. 1983))). 
77 Rule 24(b) provides the procedure for making "for cause" challenges. 
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When there has been a contemporaneous objection we determine 
factually if there was prosecutorial misconduct, then we determine 
whether the error was harmless. 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007)78 
C. The Entire Panel Of Prospective Jurors Was Tainted By The Expression Of 
Opinions From Three Individuals Who Already Believed Mr. Ellington To Be 
Guilty 
As noted above, the first question in determining whether Mr. Ellington is entitled 
to a new trial is whether there has been any sort of impropriety, irregularity, or error. 
Mr. Ellington asserts that there has been. 
Early in the jury selection process, the district court asked the entire panel of 
prospective jurors the following question: "Have any of you ever formed or expressed an 
unqualified opinion that Mr. Ellington is guilty or is not guilty of the offense that is 
charged here today?" (Supp. Tr., p.12, Ls.14-16.) In response, a number of jurors 
responded affirmatively, stating, in front of the entire panel, that they believed 
Mr. Ellington to be guilty. 
First up was Prospective Juror Ron Dykstra. Mr. Dykstra apparently raised his 
hand in response to the district court's question and, when called upon, stated, "I read 
about it in the papers, you know. From what I can gather, guilty." (Supp. Tr., p.12, 
LS.20-21 (emphasis added).) Rather than dismissing Mr. Dykstra immediately, the 
district court sought to persuade him to keep an open mind, explaining that not 
everything one might read in the newspaper is true, and that jurors must decide a case 
based on the evidence adduced at trial. (Supp. Tr., p.12, L.22 - p.13, L.17.) In 
response, Mr. Dykstra stated that he could not set aside his pre-conceived notions of 
78 Although Field speaks specifically in terms of prosecutorial misconduct, the cases cited therein do not. 
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the case and, thus, could not be fair: "I think I have a pretty formed opinion. I feel I 
would have acted a lot like Mr. Larsen.,,79 (Supp. Tr., p.13, LS.18-25 (emphasis added).) 
The next person to comment was Prospective Juror Jessica Welk. When called 
upon, Ms. Welk indicated that she knows "one of the aunts" in the Larsen family, and 
that the aunt "gave her informative opinion and we had a discussion about it. So I'm 
unfortunately on her side of him being guilty." (Supp. Tr., p.14, Ls.12-16 (emphasis 
added).) She indicated that the aunt is someone whom she has faith in (Supp. 
Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.15, L.1), and that she could not set aside that conversation and "try to 
be a fair juror,,80 (Supp. Tr., p.15, Ls.3-8). 
Finally, Prospective Juror Mark Felder spoke. He informed the district court as 
follows: 
My wife and I have read about the thing in the papers and heard it 
on the news as well and we have discussed it amongst or between 
ourselves quite a bit. I think I feel like I have formed a pretty strong 
opinion of my decision. I don't think I could give the guy a fair trial.81 
(Supp. Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.3 (emphasis added).)82 
Accordingly, all of the prospective jurors were told that, in the opinion of three 
members of their community, Mr. Ellington was guilty.83 This was improper, irregular, 
79 At that point, Mr. Dykstra was excused for cause. (Supp. Tr., p.14, Ls.1-5.) 
80 Ms. Welk was also excused for cause. (Supp. Tr., p.15, Ls.9-12.) 
81 Because Mr. Felder promised to "try" to be fair, he was not excused for cause at that time. (Supp. 
Tr. p.25, L.10 - p.27, L.6.) 
82 In chambers, defense counsel, citing due process concerns, moved for a mistrial and asked that a jury 
be selected from outside Kootenai County. (R. Vol. If, p.248; Supp. Tr., p.57, L.3 - p.58, L.22, p.59, 
Ls. 11-18.) The State opposed the motion for a mistrial, arguing that none of the jurors went into detail 
about what they heard about the case, and that the biased jurors had already been dismissed. (R. Vol. If, 
p.248, Supp. Tr., p.58, L.23 - p.59, L.9.) Ultimately, the district court denied motion. (R. Vol. If, p.249, 
Supp. Tr., p.59, L.19 - p.62, L.2.) 
83 Notably, the extraneous opinions heard by the jury were one-sided; no prospective jurors came forward 
and said that he or she had already concluded that Mr. Ellington was innocent. (See generally Supp. Tr.) 
Thus, accurate or not, the entire panel was confronted with the subtle message that the community 
sentiment was that Mr. Ellington was guilty. 
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and erroneous because, exposure to premature expressions of opinion as to the 
defendant's guilt risks undermining the presumption of innocence. See People v. 
Tyburski, 494 NW. 2d 20, 22-23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing that statements 
made during voir dire can taint an entire jury panel, thus necessitating a mistrial, 
especially where the message sent to the panel is that the community's sentiment is 
that the defendant is guilty); cf. State v. Hall, 111 Idaho 827, 829-30, 727 P.2d 1255, 
1257-58 (Ct. App. 1986) (discussing pretrial publicity and recognizing that potential 
jurors may be subtly influenced to accept a certain version of the facts by the things 
they hear or read prior to hearing the evidence). The remaining question then, is 
whether this impropriety, irregularity, or error prejudiced Mr. Ellington. 
D. The Opinions Heard By The Panel Of Potential Jurors Were Highly Prejudicial 
And. Thus, Warrant A New Trial 
Mr. Ellington contends that the jury panel members' having heard three of their 
peers opine that Mr. Ellington was guilty was highly prejudicial for three reasons: (1) all 
of the prospective jurors, including the jurors who were ultimately seated and 
deliberated, were misled as to what it means to be fair and impartial; (2) under the 
particularized facts of this case, it appears that there may have been other extraneous 
influences on the jurors who deliberated; and (3) given the closeness of the evidence, 
any juror bias at all may have made the difference between an acquittal and a 
conviction. 
1. During The JUry Selection Process, The Entire Panel Of Prospective 
Jurors Was Misled As To What It Means To Be Fair And Impartial 
Early in the jury selection process, a number of prospective jurors expressed 
concern that they could not be fair to Mr. Ellington, but were told by the district court (in 
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front of the entire panel of prospective jurors) that merely trying to be fair was good 
enough. For example, Prospective Jury Tim Cronnelly, who had been one of Joleen's 
teachers in high school and had talked with her about "her feelings" about the case, 
eventually indicated that he would "try" to decide the case based on the evidence, but, 
"[tlo be honest with you that will probably be difficult." (Supp. Tr., p.16, Ls.13-23.) At 
that point, the district court informed him that "we can't get any guarantees from 
anybody. But what we need to do is find people that would be willing to try to be fair 
and impartial." (Supp. Tr., p.16, L.24 - p.17, L.2 (emphasis added).) When 
Mr. Cronnelly indicated he would try to be fair, the judge left him on the panel for the 
time being.84 (See Supp. Tr., p.17, Ls.5-11.) 
Prospective Juror Tanya Reed also knew one of the alleged victims. She 
revealed that because her husband worked with Jovon, she knew Jovon personally and 
had had an extensive discussion with Jovon about the case. (Supp. Tr., p.18, L.24 -
p.19, L.2.) Although she initially said she could put her personal knowledge and 
relationship aside (Supp. Tr., p.19, Ls.3-7), she later waffled somewhat and responded 
to the district court's request that she "try" to make an unbiased decision by stating that 
she could "try" to do so. (Supp. Tr., p.19, Ls.8-17.) As a result, she was also left on the 
panel.85 (Supp. Tr., p.19, Ls.18-20.) 
Finally, as noted above, Prospective Juror Mark Felder informed the district court 
that based on media accounts and discussions he had had with his wife, he did not 
think he could "give the guy a fair triaL" (Supp. Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.3.) However, 
84 Eventually, after asking some follow-up questions, defense counsel moved to strike Mr. Cronnelly for 
cause and that motion was granted. (Supp. Tr., p.89, L.13 - p.91, L.13.) 
85 Defense counsel did not move to strike Ms. Reed for cause; however, she did not deliberate. (Supp. 





! because Mr. Felder repeatedly promised to "try" to be neutral, the district court left him 
on the panel.86 (Supp. Tr., p.26, L.10 - p.27, L.6.) 
The standard articulated by the district court was clearly the wrong standard. 
See State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 610-11, 150 P.3d 296, 303-04 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(explaining that merely trying to be fair is not the standard mandated by the 
Constitution). More importantly though, by incorrectly informing all of the prospective 
jurors that merely trying to be impartial was good enough, the district court: (a) 
diminished the importance of strict impartiality, thereby making it more likely that the 
jurors who ultimately deliberated could be influenced by bias and prejudice (see Part I, 
supra (discussing the prosecutor's systematic attempts to improperly influence the 
jury)); and (b) conveyed to the prospective jurors the message that bias was acceptable 
(so long as the prospective juror were willing to try to overcome their biases) and 
perhaps need not be brought up during voir dire. 
With regard to the latter concern, the district court's misstatement of the law may 
have induced prospective jurors not to speak up even though they were heavily 
influenced by the opinions of their three peers that Mr. Ellington was guilty. Accordingly, 
even though the defense still had an opportunity for individual voir dire after the three 
jurors had expressed their opinions that Mr. Ellington was guilty, that voir dire may have 
been wholly ineffective at guaranteeing an impartial jury since the jurors had been 
misled as to what it means to be truly impartial. 
86 Defense counsel did not move to strike Mr. Felder for cause; however, he did not deliberate. (Supp. 
Tr., p.153, L.23-p.154, L.6.) 
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2. There May Have Been Other Extraneous Influences On Some Of The 
Jurors Who Actually Deliberated In This Case 
Any bias that may have resulted from the entire panel of potential jurors hearing 
three of their peers express pre-conceived opinions as to Mr. Ellington's guilt would 
surely have been greatly exacerbated by any other extraneous influences on their 
judgments. Unfortunately, it appears that other such influences may have been present 
as, during the course of trial, it came out that two of the seated jurors were connected in 
one form or another to Jovon's physical therapy clinic. 
First, Juror Craft came forward with information that his mother-in-law was the 
receptionist at the same physical therapy clinic where Jovon was receiving treatment, 
and that his mother-in-law therefore had contact with Jovon "on a pretty much daily 
basis." (Tr., p.737, L.20 - p.738, L.3.) In addition, Juror Craft indicated that his mother-
in-law tried to talk to him about the case (Tr., p.738, Ls.4-8) and that he "got a feeling 
from her" that she wanted him to find Mr. Ellington guilty (see Tr., p.739, Ls.7-19).87 
Next, Juror Bess came forward with information that he was receiving treatment 
from the same physical therapy clinic. (Tr., p.829, L.23 - p.830, L.8, p.830, L.22 -
p.831, L.20.) Apparently, one of the people he spoke to about Mr. Ellington's case was 
the same receptionist who was Juror Craft's mother-in-law. (Tr., p.831, Ls.6-13.) 
Although Juror Bess certainly did not express any concem on the subject (see 
Tr., p.831, L.2 - p.832, L.5), one must wonder if he received any of the same subtle 
pressure form Juror Craft's mother-in-law that Juror Craft had received.88 
87 The defense did not move to have Juror Craft excused. 
88 The defense did not move to have Juror Bess excused either. 
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Under these circumstances, although no actual bias can be shown, Mr. Ellington 
contends that there is a heightened risk attendant to the opinions of guilt expressed by 
the Prospective Jurors Dykstra, Welk, and Felder. 
3. Given The Closeness Of The Evidence In This Case, It Cannot Be Said 
That The Opinions Expressed By Prospective Jurors Dykstra. Welk, And 
Felder Could Not Have Contributed To The JUry'S Verdict 
As noted above, this is not a case where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt. 
Quite to the contrary, the jury could have very easily acquitted Mr. Ellington-either on 
the theory that he simply did not have time to perceive and react, or on the theory that 
his actions were justified given the mortal danger he faced. After all, he was chased 
twice; his Blazer was hit by Mr. and Mrs. Larsen's Subaru; and he had a man firing a .44 
Magnum at his vehicle at close range. And, at the end of it all on Scarcello Road, things 
happened so very quickly. 
In a case where there is ample evidence of the defendant's innocence, and 
where one of the State's key witnesses has monumental credibility problems (see notes 
24, 25, 28, 29, 36, 37, and 38, supra) it is beyond mere possibility that three prospective 
jurors' unflappable opinions that Mr. Ellington was guilty contributed to the jury verdict-
it is downright likely. Accordingly, Mr. Ellington submits that the jury taint complained of 
is not harmless, and that, under the United States Constitution and Idaho law, 
Mr. Ellington is entitled to a new trial. 
IV. 
The Accumulation Of Errors In This Case Deprived Mr. Ellington Of A Fair Trial 
Although Mr. Ellington contends that each of the errors complained of above 
were prejudicial, to the extent that this Court disagrees and finds any of those errors to 
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be harmless, Mr. Ellington asserts that he is entitled to a new trial nonetheless. He 
submits that the above errors, when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in 
contravention of his constitutional right to due process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 
629,635,51 P.3d 443, 449 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507,513, 
960 P.2d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 
708,716 (1994). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ellington respectfully requests that his conviction 
and sentence be vacated, and that his case be remanded to the district court for a new 
trial. 
DATED this 13th day of February, 2008. 
77 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of February, 2008, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
JONATHAN WELLINGTON 
INMATE # 83305 
ICC 
PO BOX 70010 
BOISE 10 83707-0110 
JOHN P LUSTER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
PO BOX 9000 
COEUR D'ALENE 1083816-9000 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY A TIORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE 10 83720-0010 
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
62~~ 





vuugHo Maps Page 2 of2 
\ IT:~~':~T>~~~~J r~r 
\ .• j.., .·...<c... . Ii .·1 
I\, '\.' .. ' .' .... .... • .... ::.Jl .-' 0 _./q.-.. _ ~:;-; ,-,..., '-.·i-.~ .. '.".~-. E:~e~.J.n.·./I}~A~ .•....~, ___ .. '.':< ...•...... ~., ........ /-: .... '._".E' .•. ;:R .• ,/.,,_mn ....•. t~r~~~_ .' 
\\.c{.WSp'",l'<1dA'P""4 " L __ J '., ii' I '>, .. ,'; '1"'11 I· 
\ \." .. j\ ~.' II '.~""""~~li·. 1.. II" '.'.' "'.'. _.J~'E.W"'E,.,~"w'.3'.· r-I.. ...  1! c--\'\\\ ~ _w. -;~_ ~:,,' ,~- "? '-'' ,'- -t<;-::i.,;" ,:\ '\-;,:,:-~_-:: ;:-:'- (-:----~--'--: ·:--,-:'--:o;:-:,<.,·-_·'IV·:'- ~- 'J,/:> l:<-'" 'I! "I!: 
\ 
.\, ~. ~ " "',', li/?';. ,... ,,~ .. , .' ........... .4 .. .. ...... 'I 
-\-\> ..., £. -.g- -~ "'.~.:.,":'g.:.".. j- .;;;,~3~,"o~-=:~E'.Butte"A\f&, L--:' _w~:t""'"J":_J \-\\ a!. _Jj. --':'-~ >?_ :"'>0:; " f _ ~-' ,'a', <_c_ :,',: '-',::_'" >--<;:,~:-b '1-
\'. l' g ... "-'11 - 9' ,-" '::tl :'.,"" _ :-_ -'-' -, '<-, , J ®:':'''''.b=\L~",Jl n '1:" Ii. '. .... ~' .. 'Le .. ,E'.,YaloW.". ... A. , .•.. = .... " ...•.. . .l!·,., 1:;< '? lc-:J" " .' '. II . .... ." ". ·01 . . ...., 'I 'I \.J. ?:!-,' \':", _-=1. -J! 'r~.~ .. '. . " ,'1,' . ." -E:P"'''9ttB ... :$ \ : '_ " e' ~ - - j_ - , - J - . --, ,- -'! '-' . ~ \_ />. ),~-_JL~,"""-:~'w.s~n~,RdJz~~:"";>~ - j'I-<.-'. ___ l+·~esaa6005"Rd' ; ." .'n' . _ - E:se~OIltrRd~.i 
• \""'"' ',' ..11 . , . ~ Ii U" . {' 
.1 \- 't -~ - N ;0 e0- -- 1 -', !!!J - - _ ---
''''>0/1 .' \ 3, If ~.. . =;1 . . ,I. .... .... '.' ~"" '. '.'~~- ~"";:-;'i) If  - -' -Ii ~ ',,-' .... -- - \
\d·" i/' J ~. ;i~~]' .~. <.;¥-" .1. J, . a.. '!E -',::::, - ." I. ,,:" -, A:I_,- -,,-. 
tr" -4" j! 'I - -<I- ,- go -:. ",f,' Q, - - " 
" '[?I. I ,_ ..... _-_.' '=" . .... . '.. .1 ...... '.·.··.. . .... '.' '. ".;; '. ~...'. II ••... . . ..... .' ................... i.· ..• '.'.'_.' #' \ L r-? - """, -:-il ,.; -",,', - ,'"c.. . '. - 'dJ;' f --~-, .,... 
\ i .. ' t .....J.~~ ..... '.1 "' .• 1:000.' .. ''''''. -.. '.Rd. J PI .. ·.jl--.·· .' .... ~t··· .·.'·· .. ·····1.·.· .. ..•.. .... Gr: ........ ' ...... p. ... :. '/L"-_. . _,.' . ...... iL:. .J .' , . .• . . .• I ,  ', ••• ,<' ..... '." ;$''-<r--'--~ - ,-'-= ......... ''' .. ,'-' . - 1- "{' "-- ,- ,,' ,,'---,', -' - 'Y. 
''''';', -- -",- -- . ; '-,!', - - --< -' '.,,' , ,-' -" - .. _'-- . " . v \: . .' ·t. .' . W'6'~!)l>'i.k.d.-J!, E.BnxV;er,,,dLJ . '·'Z,,--N.<ihP.OI., 
n ... ·.··) ... ,w.CO"""."d' I .. I'f .... / ....... f· .... 
U
'! /' . 1 '< . 
~ -: -' - t . ',-< -----< ri-
.J/ . . ! h'-
1.-' 1[':- ~ - ',- ~ [ .. '!' .Il..' . . '. 'k.'{;.""~ It /", \\.-,  '.§it;-,' ;'-' i: \l 1/ . :;-t' ,,' ",' ---'~1( ~: 
'I@'. = .·A.·· .. ·····.~··A ... '. 'I ,I 41 1:2. - , - ,.-,' ' 1 ~.y, '-_ - -,e: "-"- -,-- /;..?:." --_' ",-,: -, . -_11.. ,- , 
/ ,,1 ..... ___ ' /...:; __ ' .- • 
; fi! . "'.<: <.-.-:, .... '-'A ....~ ...•..• · .... ·........ ..... . ..........• . y . .:JI'":'"-:-'-'E:-TI !f.l .JI -- v ' ~ '.-', ,--#~-. '.
l . 1f/C~0 . ....<ee .' .... "\i ....... ~ /' 
.. R,. /I... . .... ~"'" ,." . . .. "'/. poi.· •. :. -~ /,- - , ,--.' k-Dr~-j\ .' .':!. . ......... . ....•..•.•....... ' ....... '............ ...••...• ' .•. , .... ' ........ ~ .... '. h . . '... ' .... "'.' ..... , .. i ..... . "",,)-", ...•• v'" '.'l!// ..•.... 
Nil#' (9"~V ·r···.· . ';?F' .... ,A /.. '. =-~/ . '!Jy 
_,I ,L.· ,""".lL~·. ' 
' .. '.' .... '-NRO... 'e. W ...•.. """ ....... kyR.' ...=. ..•... . ..... . ".A .•.•....• >...... . ......• ~ ••.... !.E:: ........ ' ............ k.' \ - - '_g.. L ',,'-- ,'-,', '_/. ','",- ': '," " ,- A-:;, \~:Char!{l_!<",*;." S;' ~- ,-'-:,',' oj) r;/ _n,'.-',· ',--- ",l-'-"l: --, /,-
' ..... \ .••... '." '. .'?"" .' .~'.' .... ~--.•. -"' ...........•.•. ] .. -.. p' .... , ............ ~ ... ~.~'7. •. '\~ ...... ~ ..__ ... ' .. z" ............. i •. · ..... Ai." , I' "' .' '.' II'· J. ): . '. •. Ie"} s(.iOli 1 .Jl .....•• ~. 5' .. >07 ...• f1;" '~"'11 ~i'j ~JilJ ) -, ,Iiw'~~s<o·cp --:~-"yi>-/'G<~·"" , r~Dr~g,_._:,·-,~/ 
!h.'R."'." ..  .l,c.:.;:;;;:r;::",""'Od~~,","-:-';;;'-o.,-:..~ .  _.~-;;:;;::::w;~arfi&:iO.R,~ ..  .. "':,~ .... ~::. -.,11.... - oJ·"x, .. . '. '.,'. '. ..!J.ll ........ , ..... . .... f./f.I.'-f".-9 ;"""'l-<t;/ 'J ",' ," -" - -', , ' '--- r -A ,- ' , - '-, ,- {j l~~.a" . ,--' ~ -" ,- R3lnStlY" ,-- . -:-- r/ -' . )urs~r ' "!l¥/; ,- -,' - <----
~rf. ' . '[I' ~ ~ll~!L'..' .' .' .. '. ...... /;.'1 'rtd/' 
, - - ~I'.I"- t_~~~E'ChlcCl:RQ'~~·.-··-,,~, __ , -, , __ ~ __ <- ,- .I" - fP r ;.#.,.c !i .' ...... '.' ']1 @>200JlGoo9!!![fI\IilP'1liIIa·fli'2008'~~~rm)joLV'~ 
http://maps,googie.comimaps?ie=UTF8&hl=en&1l=47.89770 1 ,-116, 7766&spn=O,06051 8, O,2159S&z~ 13&om""O&nu=? ? 111 I'l{Vi9 
ATTACHMENT B 
nuuuu, lYlouel OLY ClassIC Revolver - 8 3/8" 
Register or Log In 
W Shopping Cart [search the site im 
Model 629 Classic Revolver - 8 3/8" 
.'~ '" =""",,-
c', __ .... , .. "",\ ..... , "l,)'P ",~ 
"'\ D()wnl()ild'~008 "''''' 
iVProduct Gl.lide,?;! 
1>\) ,;",.",' ·~;';'<:;"~,i.,';'.\~;,,,_, 
r~"-~'-~-'···-,,",-'7··-·1 I~Slllitb&\\€S.'lO. n'l 1~ . Cl.UB 1852 I 1 . ..... ....> . ',' ." : 
Smith&WeSS6i~'t 
MATCHES·' 
Fireann SeJeeHon Ad\ i!lor 
?;\:\\ __ 1I 
.' ·:·'=·ql!m~St·;;; Price: $995.00 * :i:;~_'~':1Q, ,,_ ,,"0' ""!fr ... ~)X~ 
*Suggested Retail, Dealer Sets Actual Pricing : ..• :'!QW~~ 
SKU: 163640 
Smith & Wesson's large frame revolvers are the first choice for handgun hunters and competitive 
shooters. These stainless steel revolvers are available in a variety of chamberings - .41 Magnum, .'l4 
Magnum, .45 Colt, and .45 ACP - as well as several barrel lengths, depending upon your need. Among 
the large frames is the Model 625, Jerry Miculek's chOice when setting his record of shooting twelve 
rounds, two 6 round loads with a reload in between, in under three seconds. 
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Model: 629 Classic 
Caliber: .44MAG/.44SP 
capacity: 6 Rounds 
Barrel Length: S 3/S" 
Front Sight: Red Ramp 
Rear Sight: White Outline Adjustable Rear 
Grip: Rubber Grips 
Frame: Large 
Finish: Satin Stainless 
Overall Length: 137/S" 
Material: Stainless Steel 
Weight Empty: 53.5 
http ;llwww.smith-wesson.comlwebapp/wcs/stores/servletlProductDisplay?storeld= 1 000 1 &catalogld= 1 000 1 &landd=-1 &nroclll 
Page 1 of2 
? /11 /?IlIlQ 
I 
, 
Page I of I 
I 
http://www.smith-wesson.comlwcsstore/Sm W essonlupload/images/fireanns/I 63640 lame .. 7111 nnnQ 
ATTACHMENT C 
, I 
